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ABSTRACT
Like much of constitutional law, the Supreme Court’s void-for-vagueness doctrine employs a system of tiered
scrutiny. This decades-old framework imposes differential demands of clarity, depending on the type of enactment
under review. But the distinctive workings of variable vagueness remain largely obscure to courts and scholars
alike. This Article seeks to illuminate this integral facet of constitutional litigation. My comprehensive study of
tiered vagueness reveals an enterprise awash with fluidity. By articulating such a raw and complex decisional
structure—and failing to police its development in the ensuing years—the Court has unsettled a doctrine whose
entire purpose is to maximize legal clarity. This Article lays bare the resulting methodological rot and charts a
path toward doctrinal reconstruction.
The present variability framework has revealed itself to be little more than a taxonomic misadventure, relying as
it does on crude and equivocal proxy tests. Nor has the Court provided any guidance on how the canonical
variability factors interact. In addition, the framework’s non-exhaustive quality has enabled courts to spin off
novel low-scrutiny contexts—ones that other decisions have deemed flatly insusceptible to vagueness challenges.
And the current system invites courts to issue sweeping constitutional pronouncements for the sole purpose of
choosing a case-specific level of scrutiny. I propose a drastically simplified model that focuses directly on the
severity of applicable penalties. Having selected a presumptive level of scrutiny on this basis, courts should then
tailor the “ordinary intelligence” inquiry to account for any pertinent attributes shared by the regulated class—for
example, children’s diminished legal acumen.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s void-for-vagueness doctrine has two dominant
objectives: ensuring fair notice of prohibited conduct and guarding against
“arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”1 But this classic formulation
elides an antecedent question: which level of vagueness scrutiny applies. In the
Court’s telling, “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates . . .
depends in part on the nature of the enactment.”2 Phraseology that would
pass muster in a more permissive context may well melt under the glare of
stringent inspection. In this sense, vagueness doctrine—which employs a
threshold categorization scheme—embodies the cross-cutting technique of
tiered review.
1

2

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles,
48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1141–43 (2017). Recent decisions have also underscored the threat that
vague laws pose to legislative policymaking primacy. See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319,
2325 (2019).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
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But the distinctive workings of what I call “variable vagueness” bear little
resemblance to the traditional forms of tiered scrutiny. Multi-layered
vagueness is not a mechanism for safeguarding constitutional liberties
regarded as “fundamental.”3 Nor does vagueness’s threshold inquiry police
the fit between the means and ends of challenged legislation.4 Instead,
vagueness variability seeks out contexts in which it is essential that laws be
drafted with precision. It then subjects those enactments to a form of
heightened scrutiny—one that, to be sure, hardly amounts to a “strong
presumption[]”5 of unconstitutionality. Given these structural differences, it
is not surprising that leading scholars of tiered scrutiny have overlooked the
variable quality of vagueness review.6
In 1982, the Court’s decision in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc. articulated a framework for identifying the degree of “clarity that
the Constitution demands of a law.”7 In distilling a core set of earlierannounced variability principles,8 Hoffman Estates relied on a series of blunt
categorizations to calibrate the rigor of vagueness review. In short, criminal
statutes and laws that “threaten[] to inhibit” constitutional rights must be
reviewed more stringently, while civil enactments, economic regulations, and
laws containing a scienter requirement need not be drafted as precisely.9
These pronouncements promised a much-needed dose of clarity for a
doctrine whose entire purpose is to maximize legal clarity. By supplying top3

4
5
6

7
8
9

See G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, VOLUME III: 1930–2000, at 598 (2019) (“A
cluster of noneconomic rights . . . came to be termed as ‘fundamental’ liberties in the Due Process
Clause and, because of that designation, triggered a standard of strict scrutiny for state regulations
restricting them.”).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1274 (2007) (explicating
this familiar feature of constitutional scrutiny).
Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 486
(2016).
See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE INVENTION
AND LOGIC OF STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 96–123 (2019); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY 71–111 (2001); WHITE, supra note
3, at 600–91; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004); Calvin
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 (2004); Jud
Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of
Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797 (2011); Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive
Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2000); David Schraub,
Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 361 (2016); Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion of
Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1043 (2017); R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85
UMKC L. REV. 207 (2016).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499; see also id. at 498 (cautioning that vagueness principles “should not
. . . be mechanically applied”).
See infra note 30.
See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498–99.
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down methodological direction, the Court seemed committed to ensuring “a
uniform resolution of important federal questions”10—one far outpacing the
Justices’ capacity for routine error-correction.
Unfortunately, Hoffman Estates accomplished nothing of the sort. Four
decades on, the doctrine is awash with fluidity; it is difficult to overstate how
impressionistic the “level of vagueness scrutiny” inquiry has become in
practice. This Article will demonstrate how the Supreme Court’s effort to
discipline vagueness doctrine instead grossly subjectified it. By endorsing
such a raw and complex decisional structure—and neglecting to police its
development—the Court effectively surrendered the prospect of system-wide
coherence in the field of vagueness variability.11 Below, I lay bare this
methodological rot and chart a path toward doctrinal reconstruction.
To begin, the Court misfired in its effort to premise tiered vagueness
review on the supposedly dichotomous nature of contestable legal constructs.
The category of “economic” regulations is hardly self-defining, and the
Court itself has confirmed that statutes can be “quasi-criminal” as well as
simply criminal or civil.12 Nor did the Court provide tools for diagnosing
“threat[s]” to constitutional rights—a concept with no doctrinal pedigree.
Hoffman Estates was also silent on how to harmonize competing variability
factors—for example, when economic regulations implicate constitutional
rights or contain criminal penalties. And despite its canonical status, Hoffman
Estates did not purport to be exhaustive. The Court’s vagueness decisions are
strewn with specialized considerations that went unmentioned in Hoffman
Estates. Lower courts have seized on this apparent latitude, constructing
novel low-scrutiny contexts out of principles that threaten to unsettle the
entire edifice of vagueness variability.
But the problem is not simply that Hoffman Estates failed to yield stable or
predictable results. Its rules often clash with their stated justifications, which
can render compliance with the Court’s commands a hollow formalism. For
example, lower courts must apparently relax their review of “economic”
regulations even when none of the avowed reasons for doing so obtain.
Similarly, many civil regulations authorize sanctions that can prove far more

10
11

12

Grove, supra note 5, at 476.
Cf. Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2045, 2046 (2008)
(emphasizing “the need to craft rules that can and will be faithfully implemented by the lower court
judges who have the last word in the overwhelming majority of litigated cases”) (emphasis omitted).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499. Notably, this occurred in a separate section of the Court’s opinion.
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crushing than the fines prescribed by certain criminal laws.13 These
incongruities highlight a curious framing choice underlying Hoffman Estates:
Rather than implementing its vision through a regime of either rules or
standards, the Court opted to employ both rules and standards, first reciting
the rules’ underlying values and then pursuing those values only through
imperfect proxies.14
Compounding these troubles, Hoffman Estates failed to follow its own logic
and acknowledge a spectrum of severity within the categories of criminal and
civil penalties.15 Probation and lifelong imprisonment bear only a distant
kinship; likewise, a loss of parental rights—a decidedly “civil” sanction—can
hardly be compared to a small monetary exaction.16 Yet under Hoffman
Estates, these outcomes register only as “criminal” and “civil” penalties, ones
subject to the enigmatic adjustments of “more” and “less” stringent review.
The Court also failed to explain why the presence of a scienter requirement
should affect the degree of clarity required by due process (as opposed to the
amount of clarity that an enactment actually exhibits).17 At most, a mens rea
element should be treated like any other adjacent statutory language with the
capacity to limit a prohibition’s reach.
Finally, the phenomenon of “constitutional” vagueness review enshrines
a remarkably robust conception of the judicial role. By mandating exacting
review for laws that “threaten[] to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights,”18 Hoffman Estates contemplates that every vagueness claim
will also yield a judicial determination concerning the reach of some other
constitutional right.19 Modern vagueness doctrine thus exhibits a tailwagging-the-dog quality that can shape constitutional law in unexpected
ways.20 Indeed, courts have embraced and rebuffed rights claims that no
party advanced—solely to select a level of scrutiny to govern the legal claim
13

14

15
16
17
18
19
20

See Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REV. 76, 85 (1948) (observing
that the “severity of sanction . . . does not necessarily parallel a distinction between criminal and
civil statutes”).
These disjunctions resemble an arguable tension between the Second Amendment’s “prefatory”
and “operative” clauses. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–78 (2008)
(distinguishing between these two components).
See infra Part II.B; see also Note, supra note 13, at 85 (remarking that “degrees of severity of sanction
vary widely within each of the two categories”).
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (“In parental rights termination proceedings,
the private interest affected is commanding”—“far more precious than any property right.”).
See infra Part II.C.
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
Unless, that is, the court concludes that a challenged law would not be unconstitutionally vague
even if reviewed under the strictest standard.
See infra Part II.D.2.
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actually presented. This stubborn order of operations also deprives litigants
of the ability to ensure a “clean” vagueness ruling that will not risk
contaminating adjoining areas of law.
Not long ago, Professor Mila Sohoni skillfully chronicled the emergence
of vagueness variability, contending that the doctrine’s relaxed notice
features “sharply lowered the costs of enacting federal legislation”21 and gave
a “boost to the project of building the modern regulatory state.”22 Yet tiered
vagueness review has become far more than a state-building project. It is a
set of prescriptions that govern manifold legal challenges at the federal, state,
and local levels. Throughout this Article, I evaluate not just the generative
potential of vagueness variability, but its actual performance as a legal
doctrine. Oddly, no one has yet examined whether Hoffman Estates has
fulfilled its promise—whether it actually serves its underlying objectives and
provides workable guidance to lower courts.23
This Article undertakes that task. Part I summarizes extant Supreme
Court precedent on the concept of tiered vagueness review. Although
Hoffman Estates remains the leading formulation of vagueness variability, its
framework is silent on six types of enactments that the Court has singled out
as deserving of either greater or lesser scrutiny. This further proliferation of
specialized contexts—from the Supreme Court itself—has powerfully signaled
to lower courts that Hoffman Estates need not be the last word on variability.
Part I summarizes both the constraints imposed by existing doctrine and the
opportunities preserved by its conspicuous silences.

21
22
23

Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1174 (2013).
Id. at 1217.
For a sampling of articles that briefly discuss vagueness’s multi-tiered nature, see Bradley E.
Abruzzi, Copyright and the Vagueness Doctrine, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 361–63 (2012); John F.
Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L.
REV. 241, 248–49 (2002); David W. Gartenstein & Joseph F. Warganz, Note, RICO’s “Pattern”
Requirement: Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 505–09 (1990); Christopher Gunther, Note,
Can Punitive Damages Standards Be Void for Vagueness?, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 52, 55–56, 59 (1988);
Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1127, 1137–39;
Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 261 n.14 (2010); Ryan McCarl, Incoherent and Indefensible:
An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Supreme Court’s “Void-for-Vagueness” Doctrine, 42 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 73, 81 (2014); Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 335, 358–59 (2005); James F. Shekleton, The Campus as Agora: The Constitution, Commerce,
Gadfly Stonecutters, and Irreverent Youth, 31 J.C. & U.L. 513, 539 (2005); Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman
Act and Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 732–34, 737–41, 744–48 (2018);
Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry Into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV. 1543, 1552–53,
1555–59 (1981); Frederick Bernays Wiener, Are the General Military Articles Unconstitutionally Vague?, 54
A.B.A. J. 357, 360 (1968).
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Part II recounts the lived experience of Hoffman Estates, thoroughly
surveying federal and state decisions implementing the idea of variable
vagueness.24 Hoffman Estates glossed over a host of definitional landmines that
shatter the framework’s surface administrability. Part II documents these
deficiencies, revealing a rickety methodology whose actual implementation
belies the test’s self-styled definitiveness. This Part also exposes notable
divergences between the stated goals of vagueness variability and the
measures chosen to pursue them. Part II closes by cataloguing the practice
of tiered vagueness outside the Hoffman Estates canon. That decision’s
unfinished quality has enabled courts to spin off new variability principles,
leading to fresh low-scrutiny contexts that other courts have deemed flatly
insusceptible to vagueness challenges. The blurry boundaries of vagueness
variability have thus called into question the very domain of vagueness
doctrine.
Part III profiles a crucial variability principle absent from the Hoffman
Estates framework: what I call “tailored ordinary intelligence.”25 As the Court
has acknowledged elsewhere, laws must be reviewed less stringently when
they apply only to a subgroup of actors who can be fairly regarded as a
specialized interpretive community.26 For these types of enactments, due
process requires less exactitude than for laws governing society as a whole. I
argue that this principle—one that holds sophisticated parties to a heightened
standard of responsibility—is a superior tool for achieving the objectives of
Hoffman Estates’s “economic” category, because it advances those aims
directly rather than through dubious surrogate factors. Part III then explains
why the principle’s converse should also hold true. In other words, when
laws apply to persons who—as a class—cannot be held to a standard of
“ordinary” adult intelligence, vagueness review should be at its most insistent.
Accordingly, I argue, courts should apply a “reasonable child” standard to
vagueness challenges brought by juveniles.

24
25
26

Because the level-of-scrutiny framework operates independently from the characterization of a
particular challenge as facial or as-applied, I do not distinguish between these types of decisions.
Vagueness doctrine requires that “person[s] of ordinary intelligence” be given a fair opportunity to
know what is forbidden. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
See infra Part III.A; see also Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 299 (2003) (“If a statute targeting a particular field uses
terminology known within that field, granting that terminology its specialized meaning is consistent
with ensuring that defendants receive fair notice of the law.”); Joseph Bounds Morris, Note, Invalidity
of Criminal Statute for Vagueness, 26 TEX. L. REV. 216, 218 (1947) (“The Supreme Court has
recognized some special situations where men in a particular field or industry would be able to
ascertain what conduct is prohibited . . . .”).
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Part IV concludes by rethinking tiered vagueness from the ground up. I
advocate a simplified two-step approach for calibrating the stringency of
review. At step one, courts should select a level of scrutiny that corresponds
directly to the severity of authorized sanctions. This approach calls for
openly considering “the consequences of imprecision,”27 rather than
refracting them through flawed proxy tests. Once a presumptive level of
scrutiny has been selected, at step two, courts should determine whether to
make an upward or downward adjustment based on pertinent traits shared
by the regulated class. Under this revised framework, the underlying
purposes of variability would no longer clash with their implementing rules;
they would become the rules. Nor would vagueness holdings any longer entail
tangled threshold determinations that too often eclipse the actual legal
challenges at issue.
It is time for the Justices to end their prolonged disengagement with
vagueness variability. The present framework has proven to be little more
than a taxonomic misadventure, relying as it does on crude and ill-fitting
categorizations. Nor should vagueness doctrine be forced to host proxy
clashes over the bounds of the New Deal settlement.28 By incorporating the
teachings of experience, the Court can clarify the basic mission—and refine
the implementing criteria—of this ubiquitous tool of constitutional litigation.
I. THE LAW OF VAGUENESS VARIABILITY
A. The Canon and Beyond
In declaring that vagueness principles “should not . . . be mechanically
applied,”29 the Hoffman Estates framework purported to break no new analytic
ground. Instead, it simply identified four factors that its prior decisions30 had
27
28

29
30

Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
See Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 321 (defining the
New Deal settlement as entailing “a relaxation of structural constraints on Congress’s control over
the economy,” as well as “an invigoration of constitutional protections for ‘discrete and insular
minorities’ along with free speech”).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979) (explaining that vagueness concerns are
exacerbated when a statute “threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights”);
id. at 395 (“This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard
is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.”); Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (stating that “greater leeway is allowed” when
“statutes govern[] business activities”); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (“[S]tandards
of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.”); Winters v. New York,
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deemed central to the level of “clarity that the Constitution demands of a
law”31—factors that would continue governing the analysis moving forward.
The first of these guideposts was expressed as a straightforward rule:
“[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test.”32 Yet the
Court also ventured to offer three supporting justifications for this rule: that
(1) economic regulation’s “subject matter is often more narrow”; (2)
“businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can
be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action,” often
leading to “clarif[ication] . . . by [their] own inquiry”;33 and (3) economic
enterprises may be able to “resort to an administrative process” for official
clarification of unclear laws.34
Next, the Court explained that due process affords “greater tolerance of
enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties.”35 Yet again, the Court
supplemented a seemingly uncomplicated test with the rule’s underlying
rationale: that “the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe”
when only civil penalties are at stake.36 For its third variability factor, the
Court indicated that laws containing a scienter requirement are subject to
relaxed vagueness review. Such a feature “may mitigate a law’s vagueness,”
the Court noted, “especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the
complainant that his conduct is proscribed.”37
Finally, the Court identified “perhaps the most important factor”
affecting the proper level of vagueness scrutiny: “whether [a law] threatens
to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”38 Two
paradigmatic examples were given: “If, for example, the law interferes with
the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test
should apply.”39 Although Hoffman Estates itself did not justify this leading

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) (“The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher
than in those depending primarily upon civil sanctions for enforcement.”); Connally v. Gen. Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926) (“[U]nder other conditions the term ‘locality’ might be definite
enough, but not so in a statute . . . imposing criminal penalties.”).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 499.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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variability factor, the Court had previously underscored the danger of
“deterr[ing] . . . constitutionally protected conduct.”40
Hoffman Estates was a momentous development in vagueness doctrine—
the Court’s first (and only) effort to synthesize its prior guidance on “the
importance of fair notice and fair enforcement”41 in various settings. To
calibrate the proper level of vagueness scrutiny, it would seem, a court need
only classify an enactment along four simple dimensions: Is the law economic
in nature? Does it carry civil or criminal penalties? Does it contain a scienter
requirement? And does it threaten to impair constitutional rights? But the
Court only loosely limned the practical implications of these classifications,
characterizing the resulting review as simply “less strict”42 or “more
stringent”43 than some unspecified normative baseline.
And despite its air of authoritativeness, the Hoffman Estates framework was
not nearly as exhaustive as it seemed. It contained no mention of six discrete
categories that have become staples of the Court’s variability jurisprudence.
The first of these is that Congress may legislate “with greater breadth and
with greater flexibility” in prescribing rules for military conduct.44 As the
Court observed in Parker v. Levy, “the military is, by necessity, a specialized
society separate from civilian society”—one that has “developed laws and
traditions of its own.”45 In this highly regimented universe, the government
typically functions as “employer, landlord, provisioner, and lawgiver rolled
into one.”46 The “overriding demands of discipline and duty”47 faced by
servicemembers thus warranted a corresponding reduction in their
constitutional rights—including those safeguarded by vagueness doctrine.
Second, public employees may be disciplined or even fired under
behavioral standards that would “almost certainly [be] too vague when
applied to the public at large.”48 In Arnett v. Kennedy, the Court rejected a
vagueness challenge to a federal statute authorizing the discharge of civilservice employees “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 283 (1961).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
Id.; see also id. (certain enactments warrant “greater tolerance”).
Id. at 499.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974).
Id. at 743.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 744 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)) (plurality opinion).
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994).
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service.”49 This hazy prohibition was deemed sufficiently precise in light of
the “impracticability of greater specificity,”50 as well as the assumption that
such a flexible standard was “necessary for the protection of the Government
as an employer.”51
Third, public-school administrators are afforded considerable leeway in
crafting standards for student behavior. “[S]chool disciplinary rules need not
be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions,” the
Court explained in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, “[g]iven the school’s
need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of
unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process.”52 The
perceived impracticality of drafting clearer restrictions—as well as the
importance of the government’s aims—thus underlay an additional lowscrutiny context.
Fourth, legislatures may regulate with less specificity when acting as a
subsidizer or patron. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Court
upheld the terms of an “undeniably opaque” financial-grant program, one
that would have “raise[d] substantial vagueness concerns” if it had instead
appeared in a “criminal statute or regulatory scheme.”53 As justification, the
Court alluded to the underlying reason for Hoffman Estates’s civil/criminal
divide: “[W]hen the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign,
the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe.”54 The
Court also cited familiar practical concerns, insisting that “[i]n the context of
selective subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate with
clarity.”55
Fifth, the Court’s recent opinion in Sessions v. Dimaya confirmed that “the
most exacting vagueness standard” applies to statutes governing the

49

50
51
52
53
54
55

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158 (1974) (plurality opinion) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a)); see
also id. at 161 (countenancing such broad “‘catchall’ clauses” as ones “prohibiting employee
‘misconduct,’ ‘immorality,’ or ‘conduct unbecoming’”) (quoting Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822,
835 (D.C. Cir. 1968), aff’d, 425 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc)).
Id. at 161; see also id. (citing the “infinite variety of factual situations” that government employees’
behavior could be expected to present).
Id. at 162.
478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998).
Id. at 589.
Id.; see also id. at 622 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing that “[t]he necessary imprecision of
artistic-merit-based criteria justifies tolerating a degree of vagueness that might be intolerable” in
other contexts). By contrast, Justice Scalia argued that vagueness doctrine simply “has no
application to funding” or to “government grant programs.” Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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deportability of aliens.56 Although “[t]he removal of an alien is a civil
matter,” the Court focused directly on the “grave nature of deportation”57—
a “particularly severe penalty” that may be more devastating than a term of
imprisonment.58 Sixth, and finally, a separate section of Hoffman Estates
further muddled the civil/criminal distinction by recognizing the concept of
“quasi-criminal” enactments—ones warranting “a relatively strict test.”59
Fitting within this category are civil provisions that carry a “prohibitory and
stigmatizing effect.”60
B. Does Tiered Vagueness Matter?
By instructing that the level of allowable imprecision “depends . . . on the
nature of the enactment,”61 Hoffman Estates made the level-of-scrutiny
question a precondition for resolving every vagueness challenge. That case’s
layered framework plainly presupposes that upward or downward
adjustments can carry practical bite.62 Yet the Supreme Court’s vagueness
decisions do not always engage this antecedent question. Numerous cases

56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018) (plurality opinion).
Id. (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951)).
Id. (quoting Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017)).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 498.
This assumption has been extensively borne out by practice. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr.
for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 451 (1983) (“This level of uncertainty is fatal where criminal
liability is imposed.”); LeRoy v. Ill. Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1994) (“As a norm
addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs, Rule 20.1 would be seriously
deficient.”); Wiemerslage ex rel. Wiemerslage v. Maine Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207, 29 F.3d 1149,
1152 (7th Cir. 1994) (past vagueness rulings in the criminal context “do not require us to declare
the school’s disciplinary rule void for vagueness”); United States v. Chatman, 538 F.2d 567, 569
(4th Cir. 1976) (“Were the statute in question here an ordinary criminal statute we might feel
constrained to hold that it runs afoul of the well-established void-for-vagueness doctrine.”);
Langford v. City of St. Louis, 443 F. Supp. 3d 962, 988 (E.D. Mo. 2020) (distinguishing a prior
decision that did not involve “First Amendment activity”); Foxborough Dev. Corp. v. City of
Hahira, No. 7:09-CV-106, 2011 WL 338618, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 2011) (“A municipal
ordinance that involves speech and carries possible criminal penalties provides little guidance for a
court considering the propriety of a local subdivision regulation.”); Richmond Med. Ctr. for
Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 816 (E.D. Va. 1998) (distinguishing earlier decisions
“because the statutes in those cases were concerned with economic regulations”); Malfitano v.
County of Storey, 396 P.3d 815, 818 (Nev. 2017) (recognizing that the Constitution “tolerate[s] a
degree of vagueness in this context not otherwise permissible in the criminal context”); Matter of
Seraphim, 294 N.W.2d 485, 493 (Wis. 1980) (“[T]hat these provisions may not have the preciseness
required of laws defining criminal conduct is of no consequence.”).
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both upholding63 and invalidating64 challenged provisions have said nothing
about the appropriate level of scrutiny. These recurrent silences are puzzling
and unfortunate. Failing to underscore—or at least acknowledge—the
caliber of review in these situations masks the protean nature of vagueness
precedents under the Hoffman Estates regime. Properly understood, the
present system of variable vagueness precludes courts from citing earlier
decisions for the proposition that certain phraseology either “is” or “is not”
vague in some abstract sense—a classic “deference mistake.”65
Perhaps these omissions have resulted from simple oversight, abetted by
incomplete adversary presentation. Another possible explanation stems
from the Court’s shifting depictions of vagueness’s domain. The Justices can
hardly be expected to invoke the Hoffman Estates framework when
characterizing vagueness as reserved for “crimes,”66 “criminal laws,”67 and
“penal statute[s].”68 Perhaps, too, courts have refrained from specifying a
level of scrutiny after concluding that individual cases would have been
resolved identically under any standard. But the articulation of this
rationale—as virtually never occurs—would seem to be an indispensable
ingredient of reasoned explanation.
In any event, the Court has done itself no credit by propounding a
seemingly mandatory decisional framework whose operation it has illustrated
only selectively. One could forgive lower courts for regarding vagueness
variability not as an ongoing constraint, but as merely a cluster of doctrinal
accessories—an option to be activated when solidifying results reached on
other grounds. To my knowledge, not a single appellate court has reversed

63

64
65

66
67
68

See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008); Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.
N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994); Gentile
v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991); Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Here, I include
decisions that characterize scienter requirements as merely enhancing statutory clarity, rather than
providing a reason to relax the level of scrutiny. See infra Part II.E.2.
See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
See Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 645
(2015) (defining a “deference mistake” as an act of “rel[ying] on precedent without fully accounting
for the legal and factual deference regime under which that precedent was decided, thereby
stripping the holding from its legal context”).
Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2326.
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). But see Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)
(“[T]his Court has held the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal
actions.”).
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or remanded a vagueness decision for failing to identify the applicable level
of scrutiny (or at least to explain why doing so would not be outcomedeterminative).
Despite these omissions, the Court has repeatedly underscored the
centrality of vagueness variability—look no further than its recent decision
in Dimaya. And lower courts have dutifully implemented the tangled
teachings of Hoffman Estates with far greater frequency. I profile this
underexplored practice in Part II.
II. VARIABILITY IN THE TRENCHES
On its own, the Hoffman Estates framework is little more than a set of
abstract propositions. Yet its strictures—such as they are—theoretically
govern every vagueness claim brought in every federal and state court
throughout the country.
Given the immense practical stakes of
comprehending the workings of tiered vagueness review, it is remarkable that
the Court’s decades-old intervention into this area has largely escaped critical
examination.
This Part takes up that task. In documenting how lower courts have
carried out the project of multi-layered vagueness scrutiny, my study detects
several glaring imprecisions in the Court’s rule statements, highlights the rifts
between those rules and their underlying values, and uncovers Hoffman
Estates’s unintended consequences. Part II dissects not only the four
canonical variability actors, but also the emerging tendency to recognize
novel low-scrutiny contexts—a departure that the Supreme Court has
entirely refrained from policing. What emerges is a portrait of scrutiny
without constraint. By acting consistently with the foundational principles
(and rule-less interstices) of vagueness variability, it is possible to subject
nearly any type of enactment to some form of either heightened or reduced
scrutiny. This astonishing permissiveness forms the core of the case for
doctrinal reform advanced in Part IV.
A. Economic Regulations
Hoffman Estates’s first variability category consists of “economic
regulation,” which “is subject to a less strict vagueness test.”69 As a formal
doctrinal matter, “economic” laws are reviewed especially leniently “simply

69

Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
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because they are economic” in nature.70 But the Hoffman Estates Court
supplemented this rule statement with three supporting justifications. These
principles reveal a disconnect between the stated reasons for vagueness
variability and the inclusion of “economic” regulations within that regime.
The Court does not think that fair notice and non-arbitrary enforcement are
somehow less “importan[t]”71 in this context; to the contrary, each principle
reflects the abiding importance of regulatory fairness. Hoffman Estates instead
posits that businesses—as sophisticated economic actors—are, on balance,
significantly more likely to avail themselves of the machinery of legal
clarification. This probabilistic assumption is thought to justify a reduction
in the level of scrutiny applicable to all forms of “economic” regulation.72
In practice, however, this first variability factor has largely defied its rulelike portrayal. Lower courts have instead gravitated toward the test’s
underlying principles—seemingly without notice from the Supreme Court
itself.
1. Which Enactments Are “Economic”?
It should not be surprising that lower courts have resisted building
variability doctrine around the nebulous concept of “economic”
regulation—a term left wholly undefined by Hoffman Estates. Indeed, the
question of which activities are “economic” in nature has bedeviled
Commerce Clause jurisprudence for over two decades.73 The term’s
meaning is even less evident in the vagueness context, given the endless
varieties of state and local legislation.74
When adhering to the strict parameters of Hoffman Estates, lower courts
have operationalized the idea of “economic” regulation using three primary
approaches. Most narrowly, some courts have required that a law actually
regulate the terms of “transactions” between businesses and consumers.75
70
71
72

73

74
75

Sohoni, supra note 21, at 1189.
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
See Shekleton, supra note 23, at 539 (“In the Court’s view, business operators have incentives to
understand regulations and to demand that government officials assist them to achieve compliance
. . . .”).
See David M. Driesen, The Economic/Noneconomic Activity Distinction Under the Commerce Clause, 67 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 337, 337 (2016) (“[T]he lower courts have struggled to figure out whether federal
statutes challenged under the Commerce Clause regulate ‘economic’ activity or ‘noneconomic’
activity.”).
See McCarl, supra note 23, at 81 (arguing that “[t]he term ‘economic regulation’ is itself vague in
the linguistic sense”).
Mass. Ass’n of Private Charter Schs. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 211 (D. Mass. 2016); Metal
Mgmt. W., Inc. v. State, 251 P.3d 1164, 1171 (Colo. App. 2010).
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Others have reserved this low-scrutiny category for laws “applied against
businesses”76—including statutes regulating “businesses owners,”77 “business
behavior,”78 “business activities,”79 and the “conduct of businesses.”80 And
still other decisions have characterized the “economic” category far more
expansively, as encompassing prohibitions that are “administrative”81 or
“regulatory”82 in nature. Needless to say, this trio of touchstones could yield
vastly different results over the full range of potential fact patterns. And the
concepts of “administrative” and “regulatory” enactments are even more
elusive than the “economic” category they purportedly gloss.
The Court’s stated reasons for reviewing “economic” enactments more
leniently would seem to encompass only those situations in which businesses
have a financial incentive to comply with the law. But not all courts have
reserved this treatment for laws that are “purely”83 or “strictly”84 economic
in nature. The label has also been bestowed on laws with an abundance of
conceivably noncommercial applications. For instance, relaxed vagueness
review was accorded to a premises-liability statute applicable to “all
landowners,” whether or not they were engaged in commerce.85 There is no
obvious need to classify prophylactically in this way—to regard as facially

76
77
78
79

80

81
82

83
84
85

Vedernikov v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, Civ. No. 18-17364, 2019 WL 1857119, at *4 (D.N.J.
Apr. 25, 2019).
Wis. Vendors, Inc. v. Lake County, Illinois, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988); Garner v. White, 726 F.2d
1274, 1278 (8th Cir. 1984).
Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d 762, 781 (7th Cir. 2016); DiCola v. FDA, 77 F.3d 504, 508 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 732 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Batson, 706 F.2d 657, 680 (5th Cir.
1983).
Big Bear Super Mkt. No. 3 v. INS, 913 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Botosan v. Paul
McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2000) (“commercial conduct”); ACA Connects – Am.’s
Commc’ns Ass’n v. Frey, 471 F. Supp. 3d 318, 330 (D. Me. 2020) (applicable to “businesses
accustomed to regulation”).
Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 816 (E.D. Va. 1998); F. Ronci
Co. v. Narragansett Bay Water Quality Mgmt. Dist. Comm’n, 561 A.2d 874, 877 (R.I. 1989).
United States v. $122,043.00, 792 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1986); Galanis v. N.Y. City Envtl.
Control Bd., 83-Civ-0701, 1986 WL 642, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1986); Vista Healthcare, Inc. v.
Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 324 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex. App. 2010); F. Ronci Co., 561 A.2d at 877; Tufto v.
State, No. 81AP-859, 1982 WL 4124, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n.10 (1974); Pinnock v. IHOP Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574,
580 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
Giebink v. Fischer, 709 F. Supp. 1012, 1015, 1017 (D. Colo. 1989) (emphasis added).
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“economic” any statute with one or more economic applications. Yet similar
examples abound.86
Even setting aside this denominator problem, vagueness doctrine is
riddled with perplexing and inconsistent applications of Hoffman Estates’s first
prong. Perhaps most dubiously, a requirement that educators refrain from
romantic relationships with their students was deemed “economic” in
nature.87 The same was true of a Bankruptcy Code provision authorizing
courts to dismiss actions filed by certain consumer debtors88—actors who
may possess none of the sophistication and legal acumen enjoyed by
corporations. A federal anti-kickback statute was likewise deemed
“economic” in nature,89 even though a commercial-bribery statute was not.90
And a regulation of medical prescriptions was found to involve “business
activity,”91 while a ban on the unlicensed practice of medicine was said to
operate in a “non-economic context.”92
As these examples show, even the most basic parameters of Hoffman
Estates’s first category have been left to the unguided suppositions of lower
courts. Nor has the Supreme Court clarified whether the concept of
“economic” activity should carry the same meaning in the Commerce Clause
and vagueness contexts.93 Far from anchoring a stable variability regime,
then, the category of “economic” regulation has been a site of definitional
turmoil.
2. The Flawed Foundations of “Economic” Vagueness
More fundamentally, the Court miscalculated in assuming that a law’s
economic or noneconomic quality would serve as a reliable stand-in for
values that justify relaxing the stringency of vagueness review. Each

86

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See, e.g., Lazy Mountain Land Club v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Bd., 904 P.2d 373, 376, 384
(Alaska 1995) (deeming “economic” a restriction on land uses that could harm adjacent property
values); Commonwealth v. John G. Grant & Sons Co., 526 N.E.2d 768, 770–71 (Mass. 1988)
(deeming “economic” a prohibition on “filling or altering a fresh water wetland subject to
flooding”).
State Bd. for Educator Certification v. Lange, No. 03-12-00453-CV, 2016 WL 785538, at *2, 5
(Tex. App. Feb. 25, 2016).
In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 911–12, 915 (9th Cir. 1988).
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988).
Abraham v. Beck, 456 S.W.3d 744, 753 (Ark. 2015).
Peckmann v. Thompson, 745 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (C.D. Ill. 1990).
For a lucid overview of the phenomenon of inter-doctrinal “borrowing,” see Jacob D. Charles,
Constructing a Constitutional Right: Borrowing and Second Amendment Design Choices, 99 N.C. L. REV. 333
(2021).
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assumption undergirding the “economic” vagueness rule—and its associated
discontents—will be discussed in turn.
a. Subject-Matter Narrowness
First, the Court explained that economic regulation warrants less strict
review “because its subject matter is often more narrow.”94 But there is no
reason why this principle could not be applied directly, rather than advanced
only by proxy.
The present approach suffers from severe
underinclusiveness—economic statutes, after all, are hardly the only ones
capable of regulating on narrow topics. Tellingly, many courts have
reasoned directly from the breadth of a statute’s subject matter—whether or
not the law was deemed to be “economic.”95 The Fifth Circuit has even
reformulated Hoffman Estates’s first prong, insisting that more leeway is
allowed for “statutes governing business activities in narrow categories.”96
At bottom, though, it should not matter whether the subject matter being
regulated is narrow or broad. Confined categories can still be regulated with
an impermissibly vague touch. (Consider a hypothetical ban on behaving
“moronically” in a specified public park on July 4.) The relevant question
should instead be whether a prohibition—whatever the bounds of its subject
matter—is sufficiently knowable to pass constitutional muster.
b.

A Party’s Own Inquiry

Second, Hoffman Estates observed that businesses “can be expected to
consult relevant legislation in advance of action”—and may even be “ab[le]
to clarify the meaning of the regulation by [their] own inquiry.”97 As with
the previous principle, lower courts have invoked this rationale directly in
selecting a level of vagueness scrutiny. Several courts have claimed (contrary
to Hoffman Estates) that the Constitution tolerates more imprecision when
regulated parties are in a position to seek clarification through their own

94
95

96
97

Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
Ky. Div., Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Turfway Park Racing Ass’n, 20 F.3d 1406,
1413 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 635 (9th Cir. 1989); Chalmers v.
City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 758 (9th Cir. 1985); State v. Anderson, 447 P.3d 176 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2019); Eagle Env’tl. II, L.P. v. Pa. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., 884 A.2d 867, 882 (Pa. 2005).
United States v. Batson, 706 F.2d 657, 680 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
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inquiry.98 And others have applied lesser scrutiny99—or even dismissed
vagueness claims altogether100—after concluding that a challenger was fully
able to consult the applicable law. The Court itself has encouraged such
personalized inquiries by ratcheting down vagueness protections for
challengers known to have participated in the lawmaking process.101
The Court’s sociological musings about the legal acumen of businesses
should be viewed alongside its earlier reflections in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville: “The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder are
not in business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws;
and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and
impact if they read them.”102 The Court should be commended for its
strikingly realistic appraisals of the legal sophistication and worldly wisdom
enjoyed by varied socioeconomic groups.103 Rarely does constitutional law
so directly privilege the interests of marginalized voices.104 But presumptions
about the ease of statutory consultation cannot do the work assigned by
Hoffman Estates. If the relevant legal materials are intolerably unclear, then
merely knowing that they exist—and examining them “in advance” of actual
enforcement—cannot rectify the preexisting due-process problem.
98

99

100

101

102
103
104

City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 429 (10th Cir. 1996); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689
F. Supp. 106, 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 673 F. Supp. 1043, 1058
(D. Kan. 1987); United States v. Sun & Sand Imps., Ltd., 564 F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Wesner v. Metro. Dev. Comm’n Marion Cty., 609 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Rogers
v. Watson, 594 A.2d 409, 414 (Vt. 1991).
See Norton Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Pierce Twp., No. 1:05cv401, 2007 WL 1577747, at *11 (S.D.
Ohio May 30, 2007) (affording greater “tolerance”); Seniors Civ. Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp, 761 F.
Supp. 1528, 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (applying a “less strict test”); Ruiz v. Comm’r of Dep’t of
Transp., 679 F. Supp. 341, 351 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (employing a “less strict test”).
See Nat’l Oilseed Processors Ass’n v. OSHA, 769 F.3d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Roark &
Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 552 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Phillips, 87 F.
App’x 650, 652 (9th Cir. 2004); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health &
Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 367 (4th Cir. 2002); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261,
1277 (11th Cir. 1999); Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 1381 (7th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Riccio, 43 F. Supp. 3d 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Med. Soc’y of State of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 777 F.
Supp. 1157, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls, 716 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Idaho
1986).
See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1952) (noting that the trucking
industry had “participated extensively” and been “much consult[ed]” in the drafting process); see
also Roark & Hardee LP, 522 F.3d at 552 (underscoring that “the City’s proffered guidelines were
drafted after town meetings with the business owners themselves”).
405 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1972).
See Koh, supra note 23, at 1138 (“[T]he social marginalization of the regulated group has also led
the Court to invoke a stronger version of the vagueness doctrine.”).
See Aaron Tang, Reverse Political Process Theory, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1427, 1430 (2017) (arguing that
the Court’s recent constitutional decisions have “afford[ed] special protections . . . to politically
powerful entities that are able to advance their interests full well in the democratic arena”).
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To be sure, I am sympathetic to the idea that unusually well-informed
actors should be held to an elevated standard of responsibility.105 But that is
because legal language sometimes carries an idiomatic meaning for
specialized audiences—not because those groups are engaged in “economic”
pursuits.
c. Administrative Clarification
Finally, the Court justified applying a “less strict” standard to economic
laws on the ground that businesses “may have the ability to . . . resort to an
administrative process” to clarify uncertain legal obligations.106 This
foundation is so theoretically indefensible that lower courts have enlisted the
principle to perform an entirely different role than the one Hoffman Estates
envisioned.
As the Court acknowledged through its use of the word “may,” not all
“economic” regulations will be administered by governmental entities able
and willing to dispense targeted legal guidance. In these situations, it makes
no sense to impose a constitutional detriment whose rationale is contingent
on the process having succeeded. The administrative-clarification principle
is also grossly underinclusive, given that such opportunities exist in a variety
of noneconomic settings.107 There is simply no impediment to proceeding in
an individualized (rather than a category-wide) fashion on this score.
For the most part, that is exactly what lower courts have done. Courts
routinely dismiss vagueness claims after accounting for the availability of an
authoritative clarification mechanism.108 Critically, this technique is
105
106
107

108

See infra Part III.A.
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 160 (1974) (removal protections for federal civil servants);
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580 (1973) (restrictions on
federal civil servants’ political activities); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 n.7 (1973)
(restrictions on state employees’ political activities); Schickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858, 879 (6th Cir.
2019) (prohibition on state legislators’ acceptance of gifts).
For examples of this phenomenon, see U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 738 (D.C. Cir.
2016); CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 632 (3d Cir. 2013); Folk v. Sturgell,
375 F. App’x 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2010); Quigley v. Giblin, 569 F.3d 449, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
Aeronautical Repair Station Ass’n v. FAA, 494 F.3d 161, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Hyatt v. Town of
Lake Lure, 114 F. App’x 72, 76 (4th Cir. 2004); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t
of Health & Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 367 (4th Cir. 2002); Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of
Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 509 (5th Cir. 2001); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); United States v. Pearson, 211 F.3d 1275, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lee,
183 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir. 1999); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 429 (10th Cir.
1996); United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Amirnazmi,
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deployed not to scale down the level of scrutiny, but to resolve the ultimate
merits question of whether a party has received fair notice. As this lengthy
experience has shown, the availability of tailored guidance has precisely zero
bearing on the “importance of fair notice”109 (as opposed to whether such notice
actually exists under the circumstances). This justification for reduced
scrutiny should thus recede entirely from the Court’s variability
jurisprudence.
Of course, there may well be sound reasons to avoid authorizing
executive actors to convert vague laws into personalized and specific legal
obligations.110 But if vagueness doctrine is to continue inviting such
administrative clarification, the effect of that process should be
commensurate with the fair-notice benefits actually conferred on individual
regulated parties.
B. The Civil/Criminal Divide
According to Hoffman Estates, the Constitution also affords “greater
tolerance” to “enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties.”111 This
variability distinction is grounded in the differential harshness of such
penalties: According to the Court, “the consequences of imprecision are
qualitatively less severe” when no criminal sanctions are involved.112 The
civil/criminal divide thus rests on the assumption that every criminal penalty
inflicts greater hardship than any civil penalty could.
Even though this assumption is empirically unsupportable,113 many lower
courts have maintained strict fealty to Hoffman Estates’s rule statement,
declining to afford heightened scrutiny to civil enactments carrying severe

109
110

111
112
113

Crim. No. 08-0429-01, 2009 WL 2603180, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2009); Lazy Mountain Land
Club v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Bd., 904 P.2d 373, 376, 384 (Alaska 1995); Rogers v. Watson,
594 A.2d 409, 414 (Vt. 1991); Nova Univ. v. Educ. Inst. Licensure Comm’n, 483 A.2d 1172, 1188
(D.C. 1984); Town of Brookline v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Envtl. Quality Eng’g, 439 N.E.2d 792, 799
(Mass. 1982).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498 (emphasis added).
See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Vagueness as Impossibility, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1049, 1091–92 (2020)
(“[I]f the primary rationale of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is to prevent undue delegation of
lawmaking power from legislatures to executive officials, this methodology is passing strange.”).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498–99.
Id. at 499.
See infra notes 123–126 & 134; see also Koh, supra note 23, at 1138 (describing the premise as
“unstable”); Robert B. Krueger, Note, Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 MICH. L.
REV. 264, 273 (1954) (arguing that “notice to the persons affected may be equally as important” in
the civil context); Sohoni, supra note 21, at 1224 (observing that “[c]ivil regulations often impose
consequences that are as severe in some respects as criminal sanctions”).
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penalties.114 Conversely, some courts have applied the most stringent
standard to criminal laws imposing fairly mild penalties.115 And courts have
also selected a level of scrutiny based entirely on a government’s presumed
reasons for imposing certain sanctions, viewing as dispositive the presence116
or absence117 of an intent to punish (rather than the severity of a deprivation).
Most strikingly, the Ninth Circuit applied relaxed scrutiny to a law
authorizing the postponement of prisoners’ release dates, deeming the
extension of incarceration periods “administrative” in nature.118
Yet the civil/criminal divide is not as unyielding as these courts have
assumed. On the very same page of its opinion, the Hoffman Estates Court
unsettled the rigid dichotomy it had just posited. The Court regarded the
ordinance under review as “quasi-criminal” in nature—thereby warranting
“a relatively strict test”—because it carried a “prohibitory and stigmatizing
effect.”119 This belated addendum can be understood as a concession that a

114

115

116

117

118
119

See Fogie v. THORN Americas, Inc., 95 F.3d 645, 650 (8th Cir. 1996) (declining to apply a stricter
standard, since “[t]he punitive aspects of the usury statute impose only civil penalties”); Trojan
Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 914 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[F]or purposes of testing the penal
severity of a given statute, Hoffman Estates focused on the distinction between criminal and civil
sanctions . . . .”); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 669 n.9 (11th Cir. 1984)
(“The mere fact that a large sum of money is at stake does not necessarily make this a penal
statute.”); CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 900 n.18 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (“The
possibility of steep fines, by itself, does not render a statute ‘quasi-criminal.’”); Pharm. Care Mgmt.
Ass’n v. Gerhart, No. 4:14-cv-000345, 2015 WL 10767327, at *7 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 8, 2015) (“The
Court declines to hold that any civil statute with the potential penalty of license revocation
constitutes a quasi-criminal statute.”); Pinnock v. IHOP Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574, 580 n.9
(S.D. Cal. 1993) (finding “no authority” for the proposition that civil enactments carrying severe
fines should be reviewed more rigorously).
See Vandergriff v. City of Chattanooga, 44 F. Supp. 2d 927, 935–36 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (applying
“the strict test for criminal statutes”). As a result, it is not entirely true that “[c]ourts will look
beneath a law’s ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’ veneer” when selecting a level of scrutiny. Abruzzi, supra note
23, at 363.
See Guardian Title Co. v. Bell, 805 P.2d 33, 36–37 (Kan. 1991) (deeming certain monetary
exactions “penal in nature,” given the manner of their assessment); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (classifying punitive damages as “quasi-criminal,” since they “are imposed for
purposes of retribution and deterrence”). As one court remarked, exemplary damages are “penal
in nature,” even if they “do not approach the severity of criminal penalties.” Galjour v. Gen. Am.
Tank Car Corp., 764 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (E.D. La. 1991).
See Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the act of transferring
prisoners to solitary confinement was “not a disciplinary measure, but an administrative strategy”);
United States v. Watkins, 18-CR-131, 2018 WL 4922135, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018)
(“[P]retrial detention is not penal at all, but regulatory.”); Raitano v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 860
S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. App. 1993) (“A driver’s license is not suspended for the purpose of visiting
additional punishment upon an offender but in order to protect the public against incompetent and
careless drivers”) (quotation marks omitted).
Hess v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
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strictly bimodal regime would have failed to approximate the actual severity
of a range of statutory penalties. But the Court made no effort to integrate
the category of “quasi-criminal” enactments into the framework it had
articulated to channel the decisionmaking of lower courts.
Indeed, not since Hoffman Estates has the Court expounded on the notion
of “prohibitory and stigmatizing” consequences. This prolonged silence is
significant, given the immense breadth and subjectivity of these terms. (Most
prohibitions, after all, would seem to be “prohibitory,” and one could argue
that “[t]here is stigma attached to every civil penalty.”120) Its development
left unguided, the “quasi-criminal” concept has effectively functioned as a
residual tool for enhancing the scrutiny applied to any civil enactment
carrying severe consequences of some sort.121 If anything, the Court has
encouraged this freewheeling practice by confirming that the prospect of
“reputational injury”—even to a corporation—warrants increased
vagueness scrutiny.122
With comparable frequency, courts proceed without regard for the
civil/criminal nomenclature standardized by Hoffman Estates. These
decisions engage in a type of unmediated consequentialism, according
primacy to “the seriousness of what is at stake under the statutory scheme.”123
This practice has had three main effects. First, certain unquestionably “civil”
provisions—such as ones authorizing expulsion from educational

120
121

122
123

Sweetman v. State Elections Enf’t Comm’n, 732 A.2d 144, 162 n.21 (Conn. 1999).
For examples of this phenomenon, see Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2019);
Powell v. Ryan, 855 F.3d 899, 905 (8th Cir. 2017) (Shepherd, J., concurring); Women’s Med. Ctr.
of Nw. Houston, 248 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Clinical Leasing Serv., Inc.,
925 F.2d 120, 122 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1991); Lamar Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. City of Port Isabel, Civ. No. B08-115, 2009 WL 10694738, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2009); Doe v. Biang, 494 F. Supp. 2d 880,
894–95 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (W.D.
Tex. 2000); AutoMaxx, Inc. v. Morales, 906 F. Supp. 394, 400 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Nat’l Paint &
Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 803 F. Supp. 135, 148 (N.D. Ill. 1992); ABN 51st St. Partners v.
City of New York, 724 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Rasche v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill.,
353 F. Supp. 973, 976 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729, 747 (Or. 2002).
FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 255 (2012). In doing so, the Court did not use the
term “quasi-criminal.”
Corp. of Haverford Coll. v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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institutions124 or the termination of parental rights125—have been scrutinized
with the rigor usually reserved for laws deemed “criminal” or “quasicriminal.”126 Second, in boundary-straddling cases of first impression, courts
have similarly calibrated the level of scrutiny by focusing squarely on the
consequences of violations.127 And third, courts have acknowledged a
spectrum of severity within both conceptual categories. Especially severe civil
or criminal penalties have thus been accorded especially stringent scrutiny,128
and vice versa.129
124

125

126

127

128

129

See Jacobs v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 490 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128
(1975) (“[T]he penalties for violation are sufficiently grievous to mandate careful scrutiny for
vagueness.”); Marin v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613, 627 (D.P.R. 1973) (insisting that “a
year’s suspension from college could well have a far more devastating and long-term effect” than
“a conviction under an anti-noise ordinance”); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp.
1328, 1344 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (“If the punishment could be this severe, there is no question but that
a . . . student might well suffer more injury than one convicted of a criminal offense.”); Soglin v.
Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (observing that “expulsion from an institution
of higher learning” may be “a more severe sanction than a monetary fine or a relatively brief
confinement”).
See Turner v. Jackson, 417 S.E.2d 881, 889 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (acknowledging the “grave penalty”
that parties may suffer from “the termination of parental rights”); Alsager v. Dist. Ct. of Polk Cty.,
406 F. Supp. 10, 17 & n.4 (D. Iowa 1975) (concluding that “the permanent destruction of the family
unit . . . is a much more drastic consequence” than certain criminal penalties).
See In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 1973) (subjecting attorney disciplinary proceedings
to “very severe” scrutiny “in view of the gravity” of the penalties involved); Hill v. Coggins, 423 F.
Supp. 3d 209, 218–19 (W.D.N.C. 2019) (concluding that “a ‘relatively strict test’ for vagueness must
be applied” given “the drastic nature of the relief sought”).
See Hess v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering
“[t]he consequences of imprecision” in identifying “the level of specificity required” for parolerelease statutes); United States v. Watkins, 18-CR-131, 2018 WL 4922135, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.
9, 2018) (stating, in a challenge to a pretrial-detention statute, that “the degree of permissible
vagueness depends on the severity of the consequences of imprecision”) (quotation marks omitted).
See Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1323 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Marcus, J.)
(referring to the “devastating consequences [that] attach to . . . [such] serious civil sanctions”);
Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d 762, 782 (7th Cir. 2016) (alluding to the “especially dire consequence”
of a sentencing enhancement); PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 466 F. Supp. 3d 547, 582 (M.D.N.C. 2020)
(accounting for “the substantial exemplary damages associated with a violation”); United States v.
Tana, 618 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing “[t]he relatively severe criminal penalty to
which the plaintiff may be subjected”); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 655 (E.D. Va. 1971)
(“[T]he greater the individual loss, the higher the requirements of due process.”); State v. Afanador,
631 A.2d 946, 950 (N.J. 1993) (“We appreciate full well the severe nature of the penalty . . . and
have given the gravity of that sanction due consideration . . . .”).
See Powell v. Ryan, 855 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he only sanction for violating rules of
the Fair is ejection from the Fair”—“a modest consequence.”); United States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d
1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e must also keep in mind that this is a misdemeanor traffic
regulation statute . . . .”); T.A. v. McSwain Union Elementary Sch., No. 1:08-cv-01986, 2010 WL
2803658, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (alluding to “the minimal penalties imposed for violations
of the School’s dress code”); Mike Naughton Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 862 F. Supp. 264, 271
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The Supreme Court itself has reasoned directly from the harshness of
statutory penalties on two occasions. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
the Court concluded that a relaxed vagueness standard applies to
governmental subsidies, given that “the consequences of imprecision are not
constitutionally severe.”130 And Sessions v. Dimaya held that laws authorizing
the deportation of aliens must meet “the most exacting vagueness
standard.”131 Despite deportation’s nominally civil character, the Court
viewed that sanction as “a particularly severe penalty” that “may be of
greater concern to a convicted alien than ‘any potential jail sentence.’”132
Dimaya dispels any remaining illusion that a law’s civil or criminal nature
must dictate the rigor with which it is reviewed. In fact, under a
straightforward reading of Dimaya, courts are now explicitly authorized to
accord heightened scrutiny to statutes imposing unusually “grave” or
“drastic” penalties133—whether or not they can be shoehorned into the
enigmatic “quasi-criminal” category.
An admirably thoughtful concurrence by Justice Gorsuch reinforces
Dimaya’s core methodological lesson. In his view, “if the severity of the
consequences counts when deciding the standard of review, shouldn’t we also
take account of the fact that today’s civil laws regularly impose penalties far
more severe than those found in many criminal statutes?”134 Justice Gorsuch
saw no justification for leniently reviewing governmental efforts to “subject a
citizen to indefinite civil commitment, strip him of a business license essential
to his family’s living, or confiscate his home.”135
Especially after Dimaya, courts have all the tools they need to align actual
practice with the underlying purposes of penalty-sensitivity in vagueness
doctrine. But because the Court has never consciously revamped the familiar
tenets of Hoffman Estates, many lower courts have persisted in citing them as
the final word on vagueness variability.136 Accordingly, only an explicit
reorientation can achieve the type of system-wide methodological uniformity
to which an apex court’s legal pronouncements should aspire.

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

(D. Colo. 1994) (citing the “relatively minor” criminal penalties at issue); Weil v. McClough, 618
F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The relatively light civil penalty to which the plaintiff was
subjected further justifies the application of only moderate scrutiny . . . .”).
524 U.S. at 589.
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018) (plurality opinion).
Id. (quoting Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017)).
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1229 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1231.
See supra notes 114–115.
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C. Scienter
Hoffman Estates’s third variability factor is whether a law contains a
scienter requirement—for example, that the forbidden act be performed
intentionally, knowingly, or willfully. According to the Court, “a scienter
requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the
adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.”137 A
host of Supreme Court decisions—to say nothing of lower-court opinions—
have touted the clarifying capacity of individual scienter requirements.138 If
anything, the Court has only affirmed that proposition more forcefully since
Hoffman Estates.139
As a variability factor, however, the scienter category is clumsily cast.
The existence of a mens rea element cannot inform the normative inquiry
into how much clarity due process should require (as opposed to the degree of
clarity that an enactment actually exhibits). And it has become increasingly
evident that mens rea requirements cannot perform the herculean task of
elucidating otherwise-unintelligible commands.
1. The Variability Mismatch
Hoffman Estates famously asserted that the twin prongs of vagueness
doctrine “should not . . . be mechanically applied.”140 As the Court
explained, the “importance of fair notice and fair enforcement” will not be
the same for all types of laws.141 Hoffman Estates’s variability framework is
thus meant to ascertain “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution
tolerates” in certain situations.142 But the Court’s observations about scienter
requirements—that they “may mitigate a law’s vagueness”143 or “narrow the
scope of [a] prohibition”144—address an entirely different question. The
137
138

139
140
141
142
143
144

Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 21 (2010) (claiming that “the knowledge
requirement of the statute further reduces any potential for vagueness”); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 149 (2007) (observing that “[t]he Court has made clear that scienter requirements
alleviate vagueness concerns”); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (insisting that scienter
requirements “ameliorate[]” vagueness concerns); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511
U.S. 513, 526 (1994) (asserting that “the scienter requirement we have inferred . . . assists in
avoiding any vagueness problem”).
See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 149 (“The Court has made clear that scienter requirements alleviate
vagueness concerns.”).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 150.
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presence or absence of a mens rea term may have some bearing on how clear
a law actually is, but it has nothing to do with how clear a law must be in order
to survive vagueness review.
An analogy will help illustrate the point. It would likely be
unconstitutional to criminalize the making of “loud, boisterous, and unusual
noise” as a generally applicable conduct rule. But that murky prohibition
would be significantly clarified by a requirement that the noise “impede[] or
disrupt[] the performance of official duties by Government employees”
within a designated facility.145 Such limiting language does not reduce the
situational importance of fair notice and non-arbitrary enforcement; it simply
increases the likelihood of satisfying whichever standard of clarity the
Constitution demands. Likewise, whatever a scienter requirement’s capacity
to mitigate vagueness, that consideration has no place within a framework
meant to ascertain how much vagueness the Constitution tolerates. A scienter
requirement is thus no different than any other type of statutory language
with the capacity to qualify a seemingly indefinite command. The Court,
tellingly, has never sought to justify the scienter category’s inclusion on any
other terms.
2. The Clarity Mismatch
Once the degree of tolerable vagueness has been determined, the twin
aims of vagueness doctrine come into play. The first of these animating
purposes is to ensure that people have “fair notice of what the law demands
of them.”146 Scienter requirements serve a valuable purpose in predicating
criminal punishment on regulated parties’ awareness of certain salient facts,
or of the consequences of their actions.147 Yet despite the Court’s insistence
that “scienter requirements alleviate vagueness concerns,”148 it is far from
obvious that a mens rea term could demystify an indecipherable prohibition.
Take, for example, a hypothetical restriction on “antisocial behavior.” It is
unclear how the statute could be violated knowingly, given that one cannot
know the meaning of so shapeless a command. Nor can a required showing
of purpose illuminate what it is that must be done deliberately.
145

146
147
148

38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(5); United States v. Agront, 773 F.3d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 332 (1988) (“[T]he ‘prohibited quantum of disturbance’ is whether normal
embassy activities have been or are about to be disrupted.”); United States v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d
1101, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he [terms] ‘harangue’ and ‘oration’. . . refer to public speeches
that tend to disrupt the Court’s operations, and no others.”).
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (2019).
See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70–72 (1994).
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 149.
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Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has denied that a scienter requirement
can clarify the meaning of an incomprehensible law. In one of its
foundational vagueness decisions, the Court invalidated a state law that
prohibited “treat[ing] contemptuously the flag of the United States.”149 It
made no difference that the state’s highest court had interpreted the law to
apply only to intentional contempt: “this holding still does not clarify what
conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional or inadvertent.”150 The
Court has cast doubt on Hoffman Estates’s scienter principle on at least three
other occasions, as well.151
Many lower courts have similarly voted with their feet, refusing to march
in lockstep with the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance on this issue. In
their view, a scienter requirement cannot “make definite that which is
undefined.”152 These decisions are a powerful testament to the illogicality of

149
150
151

152

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568–69, 582 (1974).
Id. at 580.
See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369 (1964) (“But what is it that the Washington professor must
‘know’?”); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961) (querying, of certain conduct
that must be committed “knowingly,” “What do these phrases mean?”); Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 105 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“Of course, willful conduct cannot make definite that
which is undefined.”).
State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 654 So.2d 1184, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see also Agnew v. Dist.
of Columbia, 920 F.3d 49, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding that the “vagueness of a conduct prohibition
cannot be cured by . . . intentionality”); Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir. 2016)
(inquiring, “specific intent to do what?”); Reprod. Health Servs. v. Nixon, 428 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th
Cir. 2005) (asking “what the medical professional must ‘know’”) (emphasis added); Cal. Teachers
Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1159 (“The mitigating effect of the scienter requirement
is diluted . . . by the futility of attempting to determine what it means to intend to do something
[fundamentally] vague . . . .”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (insisting that
“legislatures [cannot] simply repair otherwise vague statutes by inserting the word ‘knowingly’”);
Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (“That distinction is not clarified by the
statute’s scienter requirement.”); Peoples Rights Org. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 535 (6th
Cir. 1998) (finding that a “scienter provision [c]ould not help to cure the problems inherent in this
provision”); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 804 n.11 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We do not say that
a scienter requirement will rescue an otherwise vague statute . . . .”); United States v. Heller, 866
F.2d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that, because the underlying prohibition was “vague,”
“the defendant’s subjective intent to engage in the prohibited conduct was irrelevant”); Nova
Records, Inc. v. Sendak, 706 F.2d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 1983) (“A scienter requirement cannot
eliminate vagueness, therefore, if it is satisfied by an ‘intent’ to do something that is in itself
ambiguous.”); Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Specifying an intent element
does not save § 42.07 from vagueness because the conduct which must be motivated by intent . . .
remain[s] vague.”); Frese v. MacDonald, 425 F. Supp. 3d 64, 80 (D.N.H. 2019) (finding that,
notwithstanding a statute’s “‘knowing’ scienter requirement, the statute may still not adequately
delineate what . . . must be known . . . .”); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1148
(D. Idaho 2013) (“The inclusion of ‘knowing’ does not save the provision from vagueness.”); R.I.
Med. Soc’y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 311 (D.R.I. 1999) (explaining that a scienter
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Hoffman Estates’s scienter precept153—and to the feebleness of Supreme Court
decisions that propagate fundamentally incoherent frameworks.
In addition, as Professor Michael Mannheimer has observed, the
inclusion of a scienter requirement cannot alleviate the doctrine’s concern
with arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Due to early-stage
evidentiary limitations, arrests and charging decisions are routinely “based
only on the objectively observable conduct of the defendant.”154
Enforcement officials are thus no more constrained in this respect when the
prohibitions they invoke require proof of a specified mental state.
Lastly, if the mere presence of a scienter requirement could eliminate
vagueness concerns, then the doctrine would do almost no work in the
criminal context—where its bite is said to be especially pronounced. After
all, the Court has repeatedly endorsed a statutory-construction principle
whereby criminal laws must generally be read to contain a mens rea
requirement, whether express or implied.155 So Hoffman Estates’s scienter
principle is not just a poor fit for vagueness doctrine; it would threaten to
destabilize the very core of vagueness variability.
D. Constitutional Rights
Fourth, and “most important[ly],” Hoffman Estates specified that laws
receive stricter vagueness scrutiny if they “threaten[] to inhibit the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights.”156 This variability factor was catalyzed
by a pathbreaking student note written by Professor Anthony Amsterdam in
1960.157 Up to that point, the Supreme Court had never mandated
heightened vagueness review for laws affecting constitutional rights.158 In

153

154
155
156
157
158

requirement that “modifies a vague term” cannot save an otherwise-unconstitutional law); United
States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 450, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]he ‘knowing or having
reason to know’ language means little if the term ‘surreptitious’ is unclear . . . .”).
See Sohoni, supra note 21, at 1194 (“The presence of a mens rea requirement in a criminal statute
cannot make otherwise unclear statutory language clear as to what it prohibits.”); Rex A. Collings,
Jr., Unconstitutional Uncertainty—An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 228–29 (1955) (“If a statute is
so vague as to have no meaning, it is a contradiction in terms to say that guilty knowledge or evil
purpose cures the vagueness.”).
Mannheimer, supra note 110, at 1095.
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960)
(hereinafter “Amsterdam”).
The closest it had come was in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), when the Court characterized
an earlier decision as “intimat[ing] that stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may
be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech,” id. at 151.
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Amsterdam’s telling, however, the Court had implicitly done just that,
deploying vagueness review as “an insulating buffer zone of added protection
at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms.”159 Amsterdam’s
descriptive observation—or at least some variant of it—was almost
immediately doctrinalized as a rule of decision160 that has remained a fixture
of vagueness analysis ever since. Under Hoffman Estates, laws that “threaten[]
to inhibit the exercise” of constitutional rights are viewed with the utmost
disfavor.161
That formulation, however, has spawned tremendous confusion over the
very nature of “constitutional” vagueness review. As my research shows,
there is no settled understanding of what it means to threaten to inhibit
constitutional rights. And although all constitutional rights were ostensibly
drawn within the phrase’s protective ambit, the Court’s variability repertoire
leaves room to argue that only First Amendment freedoms are so
privileged—and that the relevant rights can be rank-ordered along a
spectrum of fundamentality. This Section documents key imprecisions in the
Court’s conception of “constitutional” vagueness. It then argues that
conditioning vagueness scrutiny on ancillary constitutional determinations
has engendered perverse consequences that warrant a belated doctrinal
reckoning.
1. What is “Constitutional” Vagueness?
a.

The Concept of “Threatened” Impairments

Under Hoffman Estates, a law will receive exacting vagueness scrutiny as
long as it “threatens” to impair constitutional rights.162 Measures that are
actually adjudged to violate individual rights plainly meet this threshold, as
do laws that regulate within the scope of constitutional coverage—even if the
government can proffer a satisfactory reason for such regulations.
Hoffman Estates fails to clarify, however, whether a stricter test is also
required for Constitution-adjacent enactments. In other words, it is an open
question whether the Court has ratified Professor Amsterdam’s precise
description of vagueness doctrine as providing “an insulating buffer zone of

159
160
161
162

Amsterdam, supra note 157, at 75.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 & n.14 (1963) (citing Amsterdam, supra note 157, at
75–76, 80–81, 96–104).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499.
Id.
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added protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms.”163
If so, then monitoring “threat[s]” to constitutional rights entails identifying
an assortment of penumbral zones that radiate beyond the edges of
constitutional protection. This reading of Hoffman Estates presupposes a
universe of lesser, permissible endangerments of constitutional values that do
not formally implicate recognized rights, but nonetheless trigger exacting
vagueness review. Hoffman Estates failed to expound on this prophylactic
concept, as did prior decisions that arguably drew such a distinction.164
Unsurprisingly, then, lower courts have operationalized the notion of
“threatened” constitutional violations in widely divergent ways. Some of
these rule statements appear to conflate threatened and actual violations,
reserving heightened review for the latter—only laws that “abridge,”165
“inhibit,”166 “interfere with,”167 “impinge,”168 “trench on,”169 “infringe,”170
or “throttle”171 constitutional rights. It is exceedingly unlikely that Hoffman
Estates intended to reserve exacting scrutiny for enactments already adjudged
to violate the Constitution—an approach that would render “constitutional”
vagueness review duplicative of ordinary constitutional adjudication.
Still other courts evidently view Hoffman Estates as requiring a threshold
determination of constitutional coverage, but no ultimate adjudication of
constitutionality. This genre seeks out laws that merely “implicate,”172
163
164

165
166
167

168
169
170

171
172

Amsterdam, supra note 157, at 75 (emphasis added).
See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979) (referring to laws that “threaten[] to inhibit the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 (1976) (per curiam)
(identifying “an area permeated by First Amendment interests”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
151 (1959) (referring to laws “having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech”).
Platt v. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, 894 F.3d 235, 246 (6th Cir. 2018)
(“abridging”).
DA Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007); Craft v. Nat’l Park
Serv., 34 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1994); Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1984).
Schickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858, 878 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Walton, 36 F.3d 32, 35 (7th
Cir. 1994); Planned Parenthood of Cent. & N. Ariz. v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 1983)
(“interferes with”).
Betancourt v. Bloomberg, 448 F.3d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 2006).
Smylis v. City of New York, 983 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
United States v. Di Pietro, 615 F.3d 1369, 1371 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (“infringes”); Garner v. White,
726 F.2d 1274, 1278 (8th Cir. 1984) (“infringing”); Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 477–78 (5th
Cir. 1983).
LaRouche v. Sheehan, 591 F. Supp. 917, 926 (D. Md. 1984).
United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“implicates”); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 265 (2d Cir. 2015) (“implicating”); FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide
Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 89 n.4 (4th Cir.
2011) (“implicates”); Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“implicates”); Woodis v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 160 F.3d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1998) (“implicating”);
Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1337 (6th Cir. 1978) (“implications”).
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“reach,”173 “touch upon,”174 “affect,”175 “impact,”176 “arise under,”177
“regulate,”178 “govern,”179 “abut upon,”180 “encumber,”181 “burden,”182
“restrain,”183 or “limit”184 constitutional protections in some manner. Other
formulations of Hoffman Estates’s fourth prong—in requiring that
constitutional rights suffuse a vagueness claim in some unspecified way—
may also fit into this category.185
Under each of these first two approaches, resolving a vagueness claim
necessarily involves a substantive analysis of the reach of some other
constitutional right. Whether the right is deemed to be implicated—or
actually infringed—will thus determine whether its exercise is
“threaten[ed],” in the scrutiny-setting parlance of Hoffman Estates. This task
is fairly routine when the challenged enactment is also alleged to violate some
173
174

175

176
177
178

179
180
181
182
183
184

185

Etzler v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:07-cv-1035, 2013 WL 1196649, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2013).
Wis. Vendors, Inc. v. Lake County, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“touches upon”);
United States v. Sutherland, No. 1:00CR00052, 2001 WL 497319, at *2 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2001)
(“touching upon”).
Penny Saver Publ’ns v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 905 F.2d 150, 155 (7th Cir. 1990) (“affecting”); Int’l
Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 830 (5th Cir. 1979) (“consider the effect
on”); Carrigan v. Comm’n on Ethics of State of Nev., 313 P.3d 880, 884 (Nev. 2013) (“affecting”).
Doe v. Biang, 494 F. Supp. 2d 880, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“impacts”).
Huett v. State, 672 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex. App. 1984) (“arising under”).
Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans, 612 F.3d 736, 749 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Bryant v.
Gates, 532 F.3d 888, 893 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“regulates”); Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ.,
271 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“regulates”).
Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 855 (2d Cir. 1984)
(“governing”).
City of Madison v. Baumann, 455 N.W.2d 647, 650 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990), rev’d on other grounds,
470 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 1991) (“abuts upon”).
Smith v. Lower Merion Twp., Civ. A. No. 90-7501, 1992 WL 112247, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 11,
1992) (“encumbered”).
Cracco v. Vance, 376 F. Supp. 3d 304, 312–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Metal Mgmt. West, Inc. v. State,
251 P.3d 1164, 1171–72 (Colo. App. 2010).
O’Toole v. O’Connor, No. 2:15-cv-1446, 2016 WL 4394135, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2016)
(“restrains”).
Hayes v. N.Y. Att’y Grievance Comm., 672 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2012); DiCola v. FDA, 77 F.3d
504, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“limits”); Psychas v. Dist. Dep’t of Transp., Civ. No. 18-0081, 2019 WL
4644503, at *14 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2019) (“limits”).
See, e.g., Butler v. O’Brien, 663 F.3d 514, 520 (1st Cir. 2011) (laws that “involve[]” constitutional
rights); Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (laws “in the
[constitutional] context”); Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005)
(constitutional rights “at stake”); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 513 (9th Cir. 1988)
(constitutional rights “at issue”); Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 988 (6th Cir. 1983) (laws that
“concern” constitutional rights); Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir. 1981) (laws
“in the area of [constitutional] rights”); Cable Ala. Corp. v. City of Huntsville, 768 F. Supp. 1484,
1506 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (constitutional concerns “present”); Siegel v. LifeCenter Organ Donor
Network, 969 N.E.2d 1271, 1280–81 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (laws “directed towards” constitutional
rights).
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other right; in these situations, courts can simply adopt their distinct
constitutional analyses wholesale.186 But when no separate constitutional
claim is raised, these approaches necessitate a separate constitutional inquiry
solely to calibrate the intensity of vagueness review.
By contrast, other courts have interpreted the notion of a “threat[]” to
constitutional rights more expansively, assuming that laws can imperil
constitutional values without formally burdening recognized rights. Such
courts have focused on laws that “chill,”187 “may have an improper chilling
effect on,”188 “create uncertainty regarding,”189 “potentially interfere
with,”190 “may [or might] infringe,”191 “could undermine,”192 “potentially
inhibit,”193 “possibly infringe,”194 “are capable of reaching,”195 “may fade
into,”196 or operate “in the shadow of” constitutional protections.197
The Supreme Court has never acknowledged this basic ambiguity lurking
within its Hoffman Estates rule statement. Indeed, that pivotal language—
whether a law “threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights”198—has never again appeared in a Supreme Court opinion. The
Court has, instead, described constitutional-rights variability in shifting terms
that track the very disagreement exhibited by lower courts. Singled out for
heightened review have been laws that “potentially implicate[],”199 that
“involve[],”200 and that “interfere[] with”201 constitutional rights. And
because the Court has never overtly revised its Hoffman Estates framework,

186

187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

See, e.g., Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1984) (free-speech holding); Shawgo v.
Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 1983) (free-speech and right-to-privacy holdings); Seniors
Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp, 761 F. Supp. 1528, 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (freedom-of-association
holding).
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1995) (“chills”).
Lowden v. County of Clare, 709 F. Supp. 2d 540, 551 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 135 (3d Cir. 2000).
Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 908 (7th Cir. 2000) (“potentially interferes with”); Fleming v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 713 F.2d 179, 184 (6th Cir. 1983) (“potential interference with”).
Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d 762, 777 (7th Cir. 2016); Rubin v. Garvin, 544 F.3d 461, 467 (2d
Cir. 2008).
State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 595 (1985).
Boddie v. Am. Broad. Cos., 881 F.2d 267, 271 (6th Cir. 1989).
Dodger’s Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 32 F.3d 1436, 1443 n.6 (10th Cir.
1994).
VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2010).
United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1982).
United States v. Morrison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1073 (4th Cir. 1988).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 21 (2010).
FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 19.
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that case’s cryptic phraseology continues to be cited and applied by lower
courts. The Court has thus erected—likely unwittingly—a significant
obstacle to the uniform implementation of “the most important”202 element
of tiered vagueness review.
b. The Domain Question
The Court’s failure to clarify the essential contours of “constitutional”
vagueness review has exacerbated preexisting confusion about the very
domain of vagueness doctrine. Laws that should arguably receive no
vagueness scrutiny have ironically been accorded the most stringent vagueness
scrutiny, given their effect on constitutional rights.
The Court has never definitively resolved which types of enactments are
susceptible to vagueness review. It has sometimes suggested that a law must
directly “regulate the public”203—by formally “forbid[ding] or requir[ing]”
certain conduct204—before vagueness doctrine can apply. Lower courts
routinely invoke this understanding to dismiss vagueness claims as falling
outside the doctrine’s domain.205 Yet the Court has also described the office
of vagueness less restrictively. Under this view, an actor need only be
exposed to “some risk or detriment”206 or be “burden[ed]”207 in some way to
call upon vagueness principles. Accordingly, a host of lower courts have
applied the doctrine to laws that did not purport to render any type of

202
203
204

205

206
207

Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499.
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 895 (2017).
FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012); see also A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref.
Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925) (explaining that vagueness doctrine presupposes “the exaction of
obedience to a rule or standard”); cf. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (“The section
imposes neither regulation of nor sanction for conduct.”); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455
U.S. 283, 291 (1982) (holding that vagueness principles do not apply to internal investigative
directives).
See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2016) (“RFRA cannot be
unconstitutionally vague because it . . . does not define the elements of an offense, fix any
mandatory penalty, or threaten people with punishment if they violate its terms.”); In re Griffin, 823
F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2016) (refusing to apply vagueness doctrine to provisions that “do not
establish the illegality of any conduct”); United States v. Sylla, 790 F.3d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 2015)
(same, for a law that “does not attempt to prohibit or prescribe any conduct”); Kinnell v. Graves,
265 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001) (same, for a law that “does not prohibit any conduct”).
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 740 (1970).
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966).
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conduct unlawful, but that straddled the conceptual divide between imposing
adverse consequences and withholding favorable treatment.208
Literal adherence to Hoffman Estates threatens to warp the preconditions
for vagueness review—whatever the doctrine’s exact reach. Courts have
accorded heightened vagueness scrutiny to laws that threatened to chill
expression, despite the absence of any formal prohibition.209 According to
the Ninth Circuit, for example, laws that implicate First Amendment rights
warrant enhanced vagueness review “even if there is no sanction or penalty
imposed on the speaker.”210 Yet surely vagueness claims should be dismissed
at the threshold if the reasons for such review are entirely absent. The
unsettled nature of “constitutional” vagueness has thus deepened existing
uncertainties about the proper scope of vagueness doctrine.

208

209

210

Courts have subjected each of the following to vagueness doctrine: a rule governing access to state
fairgrounds, see Powell v. Ryan, 855 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2017); a law limiting the subjects of
ballot initiatives, see Pest Comm. v. Miller, 626 F.3d 1097, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2010); an evidentiary
presumption, see Thibodeau v. Portuondo, 486 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2007); a regulation governing
access to public-library facilities, see Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d
1242, 1267 (3d Cir. 1992); a rule authorizing students’ disqualification from a school election, see
Henerey ex rel. Henerey v. City of St. Charles, Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1134–35 (8th Cir. 1999);
a statute of limitations, see Horn v. Burns & Roe, 536 F.2d 251, 254–56 (8th Cir. 1976); a zoning
ordinance, see Islamic Soc’y of Basking Ridge v. Twp. of Bernards, 226 F. Supp. 3d 320, 352–53
(D.N.J. 2016); trademark-licensing guidelines, see Gerlich v. Leath, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1179–80
(S.D. Iowa 2016); a statute governing the consolidation of public-school districts, see Bd. of Educ. of
Shelby Cty. v. Memphis City Bd. of Educ., No. 11-2101, 2011 WL 3444059, at *36 (W.D. Tenn.
2011); a law regulating concealed-carry permitting, see Iverson v. City of St. Paul, 240 F. Supp. 2d
1035, 1038 (D. Minn. 2003); a law regulating the “construction, alteration, [and] demolition of
structures,” see Boczar v. Kingen, No. IP 99-0141-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1137713, at *15 (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 9, 2000); a law specifying which city employees may receive a legal defense, see Smylis v. City
of New York, 983 F. Supp. 478, 482–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); a law regulating the appointment of
business auditors, see Sanitation & Recycling Indus. v. City of New York, 928 F. Supp. 407, 420–
21 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); a law governing candidates’ ballot access, see Kay v. Mills, 490 F. Supp. 844,
852 (E.D. Ky. 1980); a law creating professional-licensing criteria, see Malfitano v. County of Storey,
396 P.3d 815, 818 (Nev. 2017); a law granting tax exemptions, see In re Lietz Constr. Co., 47 P.3d
1275, 1288 (Kan. 2002); and internal interpretive guidelines, see Jackson v. W., 419 S.E.2d 385,
392 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Enhanced scrutiny has been accorded to each of the following: a provision creating an exemption
from import duties, see Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512–13 (9th Cir. 1988); a law
defining tax-exempt status, see Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); a regulation governing access to public-library facilities, see Armstrong v. Dist. of
Columbia Pub. Library, 154 F. Supp. 2d 67, 77 (D.D.C. 2001); a law providing that candidates
who failed to support a constitutional amendment would have their views indicated on the ballot,
see Gralike v. Cook, 996 F. Supp. 901, 913 (W.D. Mo. 1998); and statutory criteria for recognizing
new political parties, see Citizens to Establish a Reform Party v. Priest, 970 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D.
Ark. 1996).
Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).
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c. Which Rights Qualify?
The Supreme Court has not only left unclear how constitutional
protections shape vagueness review; it has invited confusion about which
constitutional rights can trigger heightened review in the first place. In the
decades before Hoffman Estates, the Court had—with one exception211—
reserved this distinction for First Amendment rights.212 Such treatment was
justified on the ground that free expression “need[s] breathing space to
survive.”213 Increased vagueness scrutiny for enactments affecting expression
thus serves much the same purpose as First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, which permits the invalidation of laws that “may deter or ‘chill’
constitutionally protected speech.”214
Hoffman Estates seemingly broke from this trend. In drawing no
distinctions between types of “constitutionally protected rights,”215 the Court
appeared to mandate enhanced vagueness scrutiny for laws affecting any such
right. This approach arguably amounts to a kind of general constitutional
overbreadth—a sweeping, trans-substantive expansion of that principle—
operating under the auspices of vagueness doctrine. Yet the Court did not
explain why non–First Amendment rights also deserve such solicitude.
Perhaps tellingly, Hoffman Estates illustrated its “constitutionally protected
rights” rule with two examples considerably better rooted in precedent: laws
that “interfere[] with the right of free speech or of association.”216
Lower courts—unsurprisingly—have splintered in characterizing the
types of constitutional rights specially insulated by vagueness doctrine.
Numerous decisions have drawn no such distinctions, employing generic
phrasing that affirms the scrutiny-boosting capacity of all constitutional

211

212

213

214
215
216

See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979) (declaring, in an abortion-related case, that
vagueness concerns are “especially” pronounced when laws “threaten[] to inhibit the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights”).
See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (“The general
test of vagueness applies with particular force in review of laws dealing with speech.”); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1976) (per curiam) (undertaking “[c]lose examination” of a criminal
statute “in an area permeated by First Amendment interests”); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756
(1974) (“[M]ore precision in drafting may be required . . . in the case of regulation of expression.”).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
109 (1972) (explaining that speech-inhibiting laws “lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful
zone” than if the laws had been drafted more precisely) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
Id.
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guarantees.217 Others have understood Hoffman Estates’s fourth prong as
limited to expressive freedoms,218 to both speech and association,219 or to the
(presumably) broader category of “First Amendment” rights.220 And several
courts have indicated that only “fundamental” rights warrant heightened
vagueness review—without clarifying which rights meet that description.221
Though the Supreme Court has never disavowed Hoffman Estates’s
“constitutionally protected rights” formulation, two recent decisions portend
at least a modest retreat. In 2010, the Court characterized Hoffman Estates’s
relevant lesson as follows: “We have said that when a statute ‘interferes with
the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test
should apply.’”222 In their original context, however, these two examples had
clearly been offered as subsets of the broader category of “constitutionally
protected rights.” So it is difficult to regard the Court’s slanted recounting
as anything but intentional. And in 2012, the Court stressed that vagueness
principles operate most forcefully “[w]hen speech is involved.”223 Separate
opinions from multiple Justices have further reinforced variable vagueness’s
217

218

219
220

221

222
223

See, e.g., United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d
762, 777 (7th Cir. 2016); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 265 (2d Cir.
2015); United States v. Di Pietro, 615 F.3d 1369, 1371 (11th Cir. 2010); Ass’n of Cleveland Fire
Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2007); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J.
v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 135 (3d Cir. 2000); Woodis v. Westark Cmty. College, 160 F.3d 435, 438
(8th Cir. 1998)); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir. 1988); Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470,
477–78 (5th Cir. 1983).
See, e.g., Monarch Content Mgmt. LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Gaming, 971 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir.
2020); Platt v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 894 F.3d 235, 246 (6th Cir. 2018); DA Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami
Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Walton, 36 F.3d 32, 35 (7th Cir.
1994); LaRouche v. Sheehan, 591 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D. Md. 1984); People v. Graves, 368 P.3d
317, 324 (Colo. 2016).
See, e.g., Schickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858, 878 (6th Cir. 2019); Butler v. O’Brien, 663 F.3d 514, 520
(1st Cir. 2011); Commonwealth v. John G. Grant & Sons Co., 526 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Mass. 1988).
See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 62 (1st Cir. 2011); VIP of Berlin, LLC v.
Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2010); Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d
1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006); Klein v. San Diego County, 463 F.3d 1029, 1039 (9th Cir. 2006);
Throckmorton v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 963 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Penny Saver
Publ’ns v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 905 F.2d 150, 155 (7th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985,
988 (6th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 681 F.2d 965, 971 (5th Cir. 1982).
See, e.g., United States v. Sun & Sand Imports, Ltd., 725 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1984); CFPB v. ITT
Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 901 (S.D. Ind. 2015); Bass Plating Co. v. Town of Windsor,
639 F. Supp. 873, 880 (D. Conn. 1986); Holloway v. Ark. State Bd. of Architects, 101 S.W.3d 805,
811 (Ark. 2003); Jim O. Inc. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 587 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Iowa 1998); D.P. v.
State, 597 So.2d 952, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Coal. of N.J. Sportsmen, Inc. v.
Whitman, 44 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676 (D.N.J. 1999) (inquiring into whether a law “touches upon
significant constitutionally protected conduct”) (emphasis added).
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 19 (2010) (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)).
FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
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First Amendment–centrism.224 As a result, lower courts are governed by
incompatible rule statements that the Court has never sought to reconcile.
The predictable result has been a dwindling of common ground on the very
nature of “constitutional” vagueness review.
d. Lesser Heightened Scrutiny?
However one defines the sphere of relevant constitutional rights or what
it takes to “threaten[]” their exercise, the rule appears to rest on a simple
dichotomy. Under the straightforward language of Hoffman Estates, such
rights either are or are not threatened, thereby triggering—or not—“more
stringent” vagueness review.225 In practice, however, courts have generally
recognized a spectrum of importance within the category of heightened
vagueness scrutiny.226 After all, why should laws threatening inferior
constitutional values be reviewed with maximum rigor?
Several courts, for example, have found that First Amendment rights
trigger the most stringent level of exacting vagueness scrutiny. These courts
do not limit the category of “constitutional rights” to First Amendment
freedoms alone; instead, they accord the latter a preferred position within the
firmament of constitutional protection.227 According to the D.C. Circuit,
when the Supreme Court uses the phrase “‘constitutionally protected
conduct,’ it is clear that it is referring primarily to the First Amendment
expressive freedoms, which have long received special protection in
vagueness cases.”228 Laws burdening First Amendment rights have also been
deemed “especially”229 and “particularly”230 deserving of heightened
vagueness review.

224

225
226

227
228
229
230

See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1228–29 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“This Court has already expressly held that a ‘stringent vagueness
test’ should apply to . . . [laws] abridging basic First Amendment freedoms.”) (quoting Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. at 499); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 807 (2011) (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that “a law that regulates expression” is subject to
heightened vagueness review).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes—Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 1, 19 (1997) (observing that courts often “attribut[e] . . . different valences to arguably chilled
rights,” thereby implying that some “[constitutional] rights are more important than others”).
Id. (“[M]ost courts will deem a chilling effect on free speech worse than the same chill on some
other right . . . .”).
Sweet Home v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
J2 Global Commc’ns, Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, No. CV-06-00566, 2008 WL 11335051, at *12
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2008).
Advance Pharm., Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 377, 396 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Still other courts have taken a more fine-grained approach, rankordering First Amendment rights along a scale of significance. Accordingly,
some types of speech regulations have received a lesser form of heightened
vagueness review—what one might call a “somewhat greater degree of
specificity.”231 This dubious honor has been accorded to laws mandating
commercial disclosures,232 as well as restrictions on commercial speech,233
erotic expression,234 student235 and teacher236 speech, associational
privacy,237 and candidates’ ballot access.238 Though constitutional in nature,
these rights are thought to be “not as ‘fundamental’ as traditional, contentbased free speech rights.”239
This intuitively sensible approach finds little support in Hoffman Estates
itself, which speaks of “constitutionally protected rights” as a monolithic
grouping.240 Indeed, several courts have rejected the idea that some
constitutional rights are more precious than others—at least for purposes of
fine-tuning the level of vagueness scrutiny.241 And the more fluid approach
would seemingly require courts to gauge the worth of any constitutional right
sufficiently implicated by a vagueness claim. It is easy to envision judges
doctrinally devaluing rights that they regard as morally or socially costly—
perhaps, for example, reproductive rights or Second Amendment freedoms.

231
232
233

234
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237
238
239
240
241

Dodger’s Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 32 F.3d 1436, 1443 n.6 (10th Cir.
1994).
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Bundy-Howard, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Berger
v. R.I. Bd. of Governors, 832 F. Supp. 515, 519 (D.R.I. 1993); Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v.
Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747, 759–60 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Capoccia v. Comm. on Prof’l Standards,
No. 89-CV-866, 1990 WL 211189, at *4–*5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1990).
See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976); Dodger’s, 32 F.3d at 1443 n.6.
See T.A. v. McSwain Union Elementary Sch., No. 1:08-cv-01986, 2010 WL 2803620, at *5 (E.D.
Cal. July 16, 2010).
See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Davis, 64 F. Supp. 2d 945, 956 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson
Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 701 (Colo. 1998) (en banc).
See Puzick v. City of Colorado Springs, 680 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Colo. App. 1983).
See LaRouche v. Sheehan, 591 F. Supp. 917, 922, 926 (D. Md. 1984).
Id.
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a teacher’s
instructional speech enjoys First Amendment protection under the Hazelwood standard, then a more
stringent vagueness test governs our review.”); O’Toole v. O’Connor, No. 2:15-cv-1446, 2016 WL
4394135, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2016) (declining to reduce the level of scrutiny under Hoffman
Estates’s fourth prong, even though the challenged law restricted the speech of judicial candidates);
Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Personal Commc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 805
(M.D. La. 2004) (same, for “constitutionally protected commercial speech”); Wis. Vendors, Inc. v.
Lake County, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (same, for “sexually explicit but nonobscene” expression).
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And such sentiments, once uttered, can hardly be expected to remain
confined to the vagueness context. Indeed, savvy jurists may well welcome
the opportunity to rank-order constitutional protections under the guise of
facilitating proper vagueness review.
Finally, “lesser” heightened scrutiny has also been accorded to laws that
implicate constitutional rights “tangentially,”242 “incidental[ly],”243 or “to a
limited degree.”244 This mode of analysis assumes that constitutional
deprivations operate along a spectrum—ranging from direct, wholesale
violations to incidental (and often trivial) burdens—with the most stringent
review reserved for paradigmatic infringements.245 But this approach
arguably conflicts with the text of Hoffman Estates, which mandates exacting
review for all laws that “threaten[]” constitutional rights.
* * *
Vagueness doctrine is designed to enhance legal clarity—an objective the
Supreme Court deems especially urgent when constitutional rights are
involved. But the Court’s effort to regularize “constitutional” vagueness
review has instead witnessed a multi-pronged fracturing among lower courts
on the inquiry’s essential elements. There is no common understanding of
what a “threatened” deprivation entails, which constitutional rights the
doctrine is designed to protect, whether heightened vagueness scrutiny is
itself a tiered concept, and whether an effect on constitutional rights can
expand the domain of vagueness doctrine. In time, these vices could be
rectified by a more disciplined articulation of vagueness variability. But three
other defects of “constitutional” vagueness are here to stay—with or without
greater doctrinal precision.
2. The Vices of “Constitutional” Vagueness
a.

Aren’t Constitutional Interests Always Present?

The Supreme Court’s decision to ground vagueness doctrine in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses has complicated the
242
243
244
245

Nova Univ. v. Educ. Inst. Licensure Comm’n, 483 A.2d 1172, 1188 (D.C. 1984).
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 318 (D.N.J. 2003).
Doe v. Biang, 494 F. Supp. 2d 880, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see also id. at 894 (“Section 120(b) reaches
only a narrow slice of constitutionally protected conduct.”).
As Professor Michael Dorf has observed, “Supreme Court precedent sharply distinguishes between
direct and incidental burdens” in other areas of constitutional law. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental
Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1996); see also Joseph Blocher, Bans,
129 YALE L.J. 308, 321 (2019) (observing that “the particular methodology that a court chooses to
employ often depends largely on how it characterizes the burden on the right”).
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notion of “constitutional” vagueness review. As the Court has explained,
due-process principles come into play whenever the government seeks to
impair a liberty or property interest recognized by the Constitution.246 It
stands to reason that the domain of vagueness doctrine should be roughly
commensurate with the reach of due-process guarantees—the avowed basis
for entertaining vagueness claims in the first place. The Court itself has
strongly suggested that such a showing is required for vagueness doctrine to
be animated.247 If that is so, however, then every law challengeable on
vagueness grounds will threaten some harm to a constitutional value that due
process is designed to protect, leaving little work to be performed by a tieredreview mechanism that singles out laws threatening to diminish
constitutional rights.
Lower-court understandings of vagueness’s domain make this problem
manifest. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, rejects all vagueness claims
brought in a pre-enforcement posture unless the challenged law stifles
“constitutionally protected” conduct.248 The Fourth Circuit has adopted a
related approach, permitting vagueness claims seeking injunctive relief only
when the prohibited conduct is “arguably affected with a constitutional
interest,”249 or when the plaintiff’s “right to free expression” has been
chilled.250 Given the court’s recognition that “notice of prohibited conduct”
is a type of “constitutional due process interest,”251 however, it would seem
that all vagueness challenges implicate such an interest. The Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits have thus refused to entertain forward-looking vagueness
claims unless the challenged law would warrant stringent scrutiny under
Hoffman Estates.
Consider also the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Chicago v. Morales,252
which invalidated an anti-loitering ordinance as unconstitutionally vague.
The plurality opinion opened its analysis by holding that “the freedom to
loiter for innocent purposes is part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due
Process Clause.”253 Citing only the existence of a due-process “liberty
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (explaining that an “exaction must strip a participant
of his rights to come within the principle of the cases”).
Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2011); see also id. (refusing
to entertain a vagueness challenge to a law regulating “normal business activity”).
Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 288 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers Nat’l Union,
442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
Id. (quoting Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 2013)).
Id. (quoting Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance, 802 F.3d 377, 384 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015)).
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
Id. at 53 (plurality opinion).
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interest,”254 those Justices went on to declare that the ordinance “infringe[d]
on constitutionally protected rights”—and thus warranted heightened review
under Hoffman Estates.255 This conceptual conflation triggered accusations
from two dissenting Justices that the plurality had proclaimed a constitutional
right to loiter as a matter of substantive due process.256 In any event, a
practice of applying heightened scrutiny whenever a liberty interest is
present257 would mark a radical shift from Hoffman Estates’s multi-tiered
framework, rendering its fourth prong largely superfluous.
Conversely, some courts have refused to entertain vagueness claims after
concluding that no liberty or property interest was implicated. These
holdings are often indistinguishable from an assertion that there is no
constitutional right to engage in the prohibited activity. For instance, federal
courts have found no constitutionally protected liberty interest in carrying a
concealed weapon,258 participating in interscholastic athletics,259 selling
alcoholic beverages,260 or engaging in recreational dancing.261 Had these
courts concluded otherwise, heightened scrutiny would almost certainly have
been triggered by the very showing that warranted vagueness review in the
first place.
b. Reducing Litigation Options
Vagueness doctrine is trans-substantive in character. It can benefit the
destitute and downtrodden262 as well as the wealthy and powerful.263 Because
virtually any law carrying adverse consequences is eligible to be challenged
on vagueness grounds, vagueness principles are not beholden to any
particular subject matter. And because vagueness doctrine is centered
around structural rule-of-law values that command near-universal assent—

254
255
256
257

258
259
260
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Id. at 53 n.19.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 83–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 102–06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (applying a “particularly” exacting
vagueness test in light of the court’s antecedent holding that bona fide Washington correspondents
possess a liberty interest in obtaining a White House press pass).
Iverson v. City of St. Paul, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1038 (D. Minn. 2003); Conway v. King, 718 F.
Supp. 1059, 1061 (D.N.H. 1989).
Maroney v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 764 F.2d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 1985).
Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 739 F.3d 936, 942 (6th Cir. 2014).
Willis v. Town of Marshall, 293 F. Supp. 2d 608, 620 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (invalidating a criminal vagrancy
ordinance that “ma[de] easy the roundup of so-called undesirables”).
See FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 258 (2012) (invalidating an agency’s enforcement
policy at the behest of a large corporation).
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at least in the abstract—vagueness challenges need not arouse the acute
moral difficulties at the core of many constitutional doctrines. Litigants,
sensing opportunities for juristic interest-convergence, can thereby hope to
“avoid[] a direct engagement”264 with fraught constitutional questions that
often outshine the humdrum modalities of vagueness review.
Under the Hoffman Estates framework, however, savvy advocates are
precluded from bringing constitutional claims that sound only in vagueness.
To adjudicate a vagueness claim, a court must—either explicitly or
implicitly—assess the challenged law’s impact on some other constitutional
right.265 The structure of vagueness variability thus deprives litigants of the
opportunity to frame certain constitutional claims at their preferred level of
specificity. Perhaps, for instance, one might wish to challenge an abortion
restriction or a commercial-speech regulation only on vagueness grounds to
avoid any risk of entrenching undesirable precedent. Hoffman Estates makes
that sort of strategic calculation all but impossible. In requiring courts to
confront substantive constitutional doctrines that advocates have deliberately
refrained from invoking, the existing tiered-review framework may exert a
chilling effect on constitutional discourse—the very type of impoverishment
that Hoffman Estates was designed to counteract.
c. Multiplying Constitutional Pronouncements
In contemplating that every vagueness claim will create law on the reach
of other constitutional protections—the antithesis of constitutional
avoidance—Hoffman Estates embodies an aggrandized conception of the
judicial role. And the resulting analytical detours are often executed with a
cursoriness hardly befitting their accompanying proclamations.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kolender v. Lawson266 illustrates the
problem well. Kolender involved a criminal statute requiring that persons
provide a “credible and reliable” form of identification when directed to do
so by a police officer.267 With no supporting analysis, the Court simply
asserted that the statute “implicates consideration of the constitutional right

264
265
266
267

Tammy W. Sun, Equality by Other Means: The Substantive Foundations of the Vagueness Doctrine, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 149, 163 (2011).
Again, unless a court concludes that the prohibition would pass muster even if reviewed under the
more stringent standard.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
Id. at 356–57.
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to freedom of movement.”268 It is unclear why concern for unrestricted
movement should not also encompass the movement-curtailing
consequences of arrest and confinement more generally, or at least
prohibitions on failing to obey any type of police command. Clearly, the
“constitutional right” that Kolender purported to identify could—if taken
seriously—have far-reaching consequences. Vagueness decisions have
discerned still other effects on constitutional values that rarely give rise to
successful freestanding rights claims. These include the “right to family
integrity,”269 the rights to free assembly270 and free press,271 the right to direct
the upbringing of one’s children,272 and the “‘right to acquire, use, enjoy, and
dispose’ of property.”273
Even when an asserted constitutional right seems far-fetched, it is
doubtful that vagueness doctrine should be an available mechanism for
forestalling rights recognition. But that is precisely what has occurred.
Vagueness decisions have announced that there is no constitutional right to
“build on land,”274 “hear the private speech of others,”275 “provid[e] teethwhitening services,”276 engage in commerce on public sidewalks,277 furnish
electronic devices to incarcerated persons,278 permit smoking in one’s
establishment,279 own a dog280 or an exotic cat,281 dwell on public property,282
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275
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Id. at 358; see also Streetwatch v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (“This vagueness is especially troublesome because enforcement of these Rules of Conduct
implicates Plaintiffs’ fundamental freedom of movement.”); In re A.B., No. H036810, 2011 WL
5080639, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011) (“[T]he challenged probation condition may implicate
a protected constitutional interest in the right to travel or loiter.”).
Alsager v. Dist. Ct. of Polk Cty., 406 F. Supp. 10, 19 (D. Iowa 1975).
See United Food & Commercial Workers v. Bennett, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1205 (D. Ariz. 2013);
State v. Cameron, 498 A.2d 1217, 1221 (N.J. 1985).
See Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Boddie v. Am. Broad. Cos., 881 F.2d
267, 271 (6th Cir. 1989).
See Jeffery v. O’Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516, 519, 522 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 472, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
ABN 51st St. Partners v. City of New York, 724 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y 1989) (quoting
Evans v. City of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1297 (7th Cir. 1982)).
Crotty v. City of Chicago Heights, No. 86-C-3412, 1990 WL 84516, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1990).
United States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 450, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Colindres v. Battle, No. 1:15-CV-2843-SCJ, 2016 WL 4258930, at *11 (N.D. Ga. June 6, 2016).
Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls, 716 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Idaho 1986).
Fulgham v. State, 47 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2010).
Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 552 (5th Cir. 2008); Flamingo Paradise
Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 217 P.3d 546, 553 n.6 (Nev. 2009).
Colorado Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 820 P.2d 644, 651 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
State v. DeFrancesco, 668 A.2d 348, 358 n.21 (Conn. 1995).
Tobe v. City of Santa Anna, 892 P.2d 1145, 1169 (Cal. 1995).
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or “drive trucks of any particular weight.”283 Vagueness doctrine has thus
become saturated with dismissive constitutional pronouncements delivered
only in passing.
Such drive-by declarations have appeared in highly charged contexts, as
well. Few would contend, for example, that the jurisprudence of abortion
restrictions should be influenced by incidental utterances made simply to
select a level of vagueness scrutiny. Yet in Colautti v. Franklin—a case
presenting only a vagueness claim—the Supreme Court stated that a law
criminalizing the performance of certain kinds of abortions exerted a
“chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights.”284 The more
generalized right to privacy, too, has featured prominently at the threshold
of courts’ vagueness analyses.285
The Hoffman Estates regime has also yielded notable statements on the
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.286 Even before the Supreme
Court’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller,287 at least three vagueness
decisions found that restrictions on non-militia-related weapons use
implicated state constitutional rights.288 Other pre-Heller decisions, in the
course of adjudicating vagueness claims, found no impact on federally

283
284
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Ruiz v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Transp., 679 F. Supp. 341, 350 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer,
220 F.3d 127, 135 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing that laws affecting “a woman’s right to abortion” must
exhibit “a higher degree of clarity”); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 205
(6th Cir. 1997) (“The uncertainty induced by this statute therefore threatens to inhibit the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights.”).
See Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 971 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“[P]etitioners’ lawful, off-duty sexual conduct clearly implicates the ‘fundamental . . .
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one’s privacy’” (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); Doe v. Biang, 494 F. Supp.
2d 880, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding that the challenged law, “albeit to a limited degree, impacts an
offender’s right to privacy”); State v. Cameron, 498 A.2d 1217, 1221 (N.J. 1985) (“The threat or
actuality of enforcement could undermine the right[] to . . . privacy.”); Puzick v. City of Colorado
Springs, 680 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Colo. App. 1983) (concluding that the plaintiff’s conduct was not
“constitutionally protected as within the zone of privacy”).
See Daniel Rice, Variable Vagueness and the Shadow Second Amendment, SECOND THOUGHTS (Duke
Center
for
Firearms
Law)
(July
8,
2020),
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/
2020/07/variable-vagueness-and-the-shadow-second-amendment/
[https://perma.cc/B6CDSTEC] (arguing that “firearms scholars should closely monitor signs of symbiosis between Second
Amendment doctrine and vagueness variability”).
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
See Klein v. Leis, 767 N.E.2d 286, 295 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Robertson v. City & Cty. of Denver,
978 P.2d 156, 159 (Colo. App. 1999); People v. McFadden, 188 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971).

December 2021]

VARIABLE VAGUENESS

1005

protected Second Amendment rights.289 And both stand-alone290 and
concurrent291 vagueness claims brought after Heller have yielded significant
statements on the coverage of key Second Amendment concepts. It is highly
questionable whether this fraught realm of constitutional law should be
informed by subsidiary—and often perfunctory—observations concerning
the Second Amendment’s reach. The same is true of courts’ vaguenessdriven forays into other areas, including the First Amendment rights of free
expression292 and free exercise.293
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290

291

292
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See United States v. Roach, 201 F. App’x 969, 974 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that “drug users and
addicts have no fundamental right to bear arms”); United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094, 1105
(10th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that a statute banning the sale of explosives “d[id] not implicate” the
Second Amendment); Peoples Rights Org. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 538 (6th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he Federal Constitution does not provide a right to possess an assault weapon.”); Coal. of N.J.
Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman, 44 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating that several firearmrelated restrictions, including bans on “assault firearms” and “large capacity ammunition
magazines,” “d[id] not implicate constitutionally protected conduct”); Richmond Boro Gun Club,
Inc. v. City of New York, 896 F. Supp. 276, 279, 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (asserting that an ordinance
banning the possession or transfer of certain “assault weapons” and “ammunition feeding devices”
“implicate[d] no constitutionally protected conduct”); State v. Thomas, 683 N.W.2d 497, 525–26
(Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (finding “no basis for a felon to assume that . . . he or she is within his or her
lawful right to bear [a] firearm”); State v. Vitale, No. CR8-930111888S, 1994 WL 282254, at *6
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (concluding that a general reckless-endangerment prohibition “d[id] not
threaten to inhibit the exercise of . . . the right to bear arms”).
See Parker v. State, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 345, 365–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that statutes
regulating the sale, delivery, and transfer of handgun ammunition “implicate[d] . . . individual
rights under the Second Amendment,” given that “the utility of a gun for self-defense purposes is
greatly reduced without ammunition”), rev. granted and op. superseded, 317 P.3d 1184 (Cal. 2014),
dismissed as moot, 384 P.3d 1242 (Cal. 2016).
See United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2020) (a law prohibiting firearm ownership
by “unlawful user[s]” of controlled substances “implicate[d] [the] Second Amendment right to
possess a gun”); United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (a law prohibiting
firearm possession on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol “implicate[d] the right to bear arms”); N.Y.
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 265 (2d Cir. 2015) (laws prohibiting the
possession of certain semiautomatic weapons and large-capacity magazines “implicat[ed] the
exercise of constitutional rights”); United States v. Moss, No. 18-CR-316, 2019 WL 3215960, at *2
(D. Conn. July 17, 2019) (a law prohibiting firearm possession by persons addicted to controlled
substances “did not implicate” the Second Amendment); Kuck v. Danaher, 822 F. Supp. 2d 109,
133 (D. Conn. 2011) (a permitting scheme governing the carrying of firearms outside the home
“implicate[d] a constitutional right”).
See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 254 (2012); United States v. Jaensch, 665
F.3d 83, 89 n.4 (4th Cir. 2011); Gresham, 225 F.3d at 908; CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d
934, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2016); United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 731, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
McCoy v. City of Columbia, 929 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552 (D.S.C. 2013); Wis. Vendors, Inc., 152 F.
Supp. 2d at 1095; United States v. Pourhassan, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1191 (D. Utah 2001); State
v. Indrisano, 640 A.2d 986, 996 (Conn. 1994); Cameron, 498 A.2d at 1221; Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski
Dev. Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 675 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
See Islamic Soc’y of Basking Ridge v. Twp. of Bernards, 226 F. Supp. 3d 320, 354 (D.N.J 2016);
Care & Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Mass. 1987); Cameron, 498 A.2d at 1221.
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E. Scrutiny Outside the Canon
As demonstrated above, Hoffman Estates’s four-part framework has proven
devilishly complex to administer. But that limited ensemble of factors is only
part of the official story. The Court itself has advanced additional variability
principles—ones that lower courts have drawn upon to fashion novel lowscrutiny contexts. And those courts, perhaps emboldened by Hoffman Estates’s
non-exhaustive quality, have articulated and applied variability principles
with no apparent grounding in Supreme Court precedent.
This Section profiles the development of vagueness scrutiny outside
Hoffman Estates’s four canonical categories. The doctrine has witnessed
sweeping assertions that certain kinds of laws must be afforded near-total
deference—seemingly without regard to the severity of accompanying
penalties. The bottom-up fragmentation of tiered vagueness review further
illustrates just how fluid and impressionistic the level-of-scrutiny inquiry has
become in the absence of Supreme Court supervision. Strangely, this process
often proceeds without regard for the basic purposes of vagueness doctrine,
yielding disagreement about whether certain types of laws warrant low
scrutiny or no scrutiny.
1. Governmental Interest
In a dissenting opinion published in 1948, Justice Felix Frankfurter—with
his typical scholarly flair—penned the first defense of tiered vagueness review
ever to appear in the U.S Reports. He reasoned that “whether notice is or
is not ‘fair’ depends upon the subject matter to which it relates.”294 Chief
among his chosen considerations was the following: “How important is the
policy of the legislation”?295 For Frankfurter, this was a matter of
comparative institutional capability. When a policy “closely relate[s] to the
basic function of government,”296 he believed, the degree of allowable
precision should be entrusted to “the competence of legislatures.”297
In one sense, Frankfurter’s vision failed to win the day. The perceived
importance of the government’s interest figured nowhere in Hoffman Estates’s
list of variability factors. In context, that was an especially notable omission:

294
295
296
297

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 525.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 526; see also Note, Indefinite Criteria of Definiteness in Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 160, 163 (1931)
(arguing that robust vagueness review “shows a regrettable disregard for the essential problems of
the legislature”).
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The power to define and punish criminal activity is surely a core
governmental concern, yet legislatures must draft such laws with heightened
precision.298 And the Court has twice rejected the idea that vital state
interests can compensate for statutory vagueness.299 But other Supreme
Court decisions have underscored the importance of policies challenged on
vagueness grounds.300 The Court has cautioned that invalidating opaquely
worded public-subsidy criteria would bring an end to countless “valuable
Government programs.”301 According to the Court, moreover, inexact civilservice retention standards are “necessary for the protection of the
Government as an employer.”302 And the Court has characterized the
military’s development of a distinct body of law as “essential to perform[ing]
its mission effectively.”303 Lower courts have thus accorded “substantial
judicial deference”304 to vaguely worded military regulations, opting to trust
“the professional judgment of military authorities” on those matters.305
At the intersection of the latter two connections—public employment
and the maintenance of unified force-wielding teams—lies the lawenforcement context. Lower courts have permitted police officers to be fired
or otherwise disciplined under open-ended regulations that would never
suffice in the criminal context. Such decisions have cited local governments’
“substantial interest in creating and maintaining an efficient police
organization”306—a benefit that redounds to “the good of all members of
society.”307 Courts have also invoked the “peculiar needs” of penal
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301
302
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304
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See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982).
See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1982) (“As weighty as this concern is, however, it cannot
justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and
clarity.”); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968) (“Nor is it an answer
to an argument that a particular regulation of expression is vague to say that it was adopted for the
salutary purpose of protecting children.”).
See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189,
196 (1985) (noting that “the nature of the governmental interest” is “considered in the vagueness
inquiry”).
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998).
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 162 (1974); see also Hernandez v. Bailey, 716 F. App’x 298, 305
(5th Cir. 2018) (cautioning that the application of ordinary vagueness principles in this context
could “undermin[e] the intragovernmental relationships that facilitate the exercise of state
governmental power”).
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); see also Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal
Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491, 504 (1994) (characterizing Levy as concluding that such
broad prohibitions were “necessary for the achievement of military objectives”).
Gen. Media Commc’ns, 131 F.3d 273, 286 (2d Cir. 1997).
Stein v. Mabus, No. 3:12-CV-00816-H, 2013 WL 12092058, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2013).
Puzick v. City of Colorado Springs, 680 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Colo. App. 1983).
Vorbeck v. Schnicker, 660 F.2d 1260, 1263 (8th Cir. 1981).
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institutions in upholding ill-defined prison regulations,308 “even . . . where
the First Amendment freedoms of inmates are implicated.”309 Such
deference is considered “necessary to ensure safety and order in a dangerous
environment.”310 The Supreme Court has likewise deemed flexible
disciplinary rules essential to “maintaining security and order” in public
schools.311 Predictably, lower courts have afforded school officials “broad
discretion in enforcement of school codes.”312
Moving beyond these institutional contexts, the Court long ago embraced
a loosely worded forest-fire-prevention statute as necessary to avert “one of
the great economic misfortunes of the country.”313 The D.C. Circuit has
afforded Congress greater latitude to regulate in the realm of foreign affairs,
given the “special exigencies of foreign policy.”314 One court has
characterized the “preservation of dignity and decorum” at national
cemeteries as “a paramount concern”—one justifying even the criminalization
of behavior that “def[ies] objective description.”315 Finally—and most
expansively of all—courts have leniently reviewed enactments designed to
“promote the public welfare”316 and protect “public health and safety.”317
As these examples show, the practice of ratcheting down the level of
vagueness scrutiny in response to an important governmental interest has
crowded out judicial concern for the severity of resulting deprivations. No
sensible tiered-vagueness regime could long survive this trumping effect.
What enactment, after all, does not aim to enhance “public welfare”? And
what good is a constitutional protection whose strictures all but vanish
whenever a regulation serves weighty governmental interests? It is
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309
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United States v. Chatman, 538 F.2d 567, 569 (4th Cir. 1976).
Chatin v. New York, No. 96-Civ-420, 1998 WL 196195, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Hughes v. Werlinger, No. 11-C-219, 2014 WL 1670095, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 28, 2014); see also
Meyers v. Aldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 1974) (contending that “vagueness principles must
be applied in light of the legitimate needs of prison administration”).
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (quotation marks omitted).
Wiemerslage ex rel. Wiemerslage v. Me. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207, 824 F. Supp. 136, 141 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927).
Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Heyert v. Taddese, 70 A.3d 680, 702 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1991); see also United
States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011) (permissively reviewing a law “enacted for
the safety of the driving public”); United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir. 1971)
(holding that civil executives enjoy “broad discretion” to issue binding directives to “maintain order
and protect lives and property”).
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remarkable that the Court has permitted these antithetical approaches to
take hold, thereby undercutting the force of its own pronouncements.
2. Inability to Draft More Precisely
In his prescient tour through vagueness variability, Justice Frankfurter
tendered another observation: Language that seems “meaningless” for one
purpose “may be as definite as another subject-matter of legislation
permits.”318 Elevating this axiom into a normative touchstone, Frankfurter
thus inquired, “[h]ow easy is it to be explicitly particular?”319 In his view,
enactments that are as clear as circumstances allow ought to be reviewed
with the utmost toleration.
Once again, because Frankfurter’s insight was not memorialized by
Hoffman Estates, it failed to win esteem as an acknowledged doctrinal
principle. But the approach has burrowed into the infrastructure of tiered
vagueness review nonetheless. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
referenced the “impracticality of greater specificity” in deciding whether
textual imprecision crosses a constitutional line.320 It has even applied this
principle to statutory standards for imposing the death penalty—the harshest
sanction known to American law.321 Lower courts have followed suit in
countless settings, “uph[olding] ‘catch-all’ clauses where it is impractical to
formulate an exhaustive list of actionable conduct.”322
318
319
320

321

322

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 525 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 161 (1974) (plurality opinion); see also Nat’l Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998) (“In the context of selective subsidies, it is not always feasible
for Congress to legislate with clarity.”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (“[T]his is
not a case where further precision in the statutory language is either impossible or impractical.”);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581–82 (1974) (“[N]othing prevents a legislature from defining
with substantial specificity what constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags.”); Robinson,
supra note 23, at 381 (“[T]he standard of vagueness must . . . be adjusted to take account of the
extent to which precision is possible.”); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 661 (1981) (“[C]ourts are generally more tolerant of vagueness where
value references are inevitable than where the legislature could define facts more precisely.”).
See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994) (noting that “our vagueness review is quite
deferential” when considering such aggravating factors, which are “not susceptible of mathematical
precision”).
Donovan v. City of Haverhill, 311 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2002). Decisions citing the inevitability of
generality have upheld challenged regulations in the following contexts: traffic safety, see United
States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011); excessive noise, see DA Mortg., Inc. v. City
of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007); accommodations for the disabled, see
Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 837 (9th Cir. 2000); the discipline of public-school
teachers, see Marchi v. Bd. of Cooperative Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 480 (2d Cir. 1999);
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As with the “governmental interest” principle discussed above, the
“impracticality of specificity” approach is difficult to square with the broader
Hoffman Estates rubric. As long as the Court continues to subject certain
enactments to exacting scrutiny, it is rank question-begging to relax the
stringency of review for any type of regulation deemed “inherently
discretionary”323 or difficult to formulate with precision. If a legislature or
agency cannot achieve the exactitude necessary for a law imposing some
drastic consequence, then the regulation should simply be constitutionally
forbidden. For example, it may be extremely difficult to particularize which
types of conduct present “a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”324 (That is presumably why Congress chose to employ such
residual verbiage in drafting the Armed Career Criminal Act.) But the Court
did not hesitate to invalidate statutory language employing that impenetrable
phrase.325 It is difficult to see why vagueness doctrine should insist on
minimum standards of clarity and fair enforcement only when it would not
be challenging to provide them.
On a more practical level, courts will rarely be equipped to determine
whether circumstances would “prevent[] a legislature from [drafting] with
substantial specificity”326 in a given area. One cannot assess the
“practicability of using more exact[] terms”327 without canvassing the subject
matter at issue and hypothesizing a spectrum of alternative drafting choices.
This type of institutional role-play would seem to require a level of technical
proficiency that generalist judges cannot responsibly profess. It should come
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324
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327

the practice of medicine, see Varandani v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1987); the killing of
migratory birds, see United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 438 (8th Cir. 1986); protective
equipment on jobsites, see McLean Trucking Co. v. OSHA, 503 F.2d 8, 10 (4th Cir. 1974); health
standards for aviators, see Greve v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 378 F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 1967); toxic
substances, see Galjour v. Gen. Am. Tank Car Corp., 764 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (E.D. La. 1991); the
removal of judicial officers, see Sarisohn v. Appellate Division, 265 F. Supp. 455, 458 (E.D.N.Y.
1967); land use, see Covel v. Town of Vienna, 78 Va. Cir. 190, 217 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2009); the
impeachment of local officials, see Fitzgerald v. City of Md. Heights, 796 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); air pollution, see Town of Brookline v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Envt’l Quality Eng’g, 439
N.E.2d 792, 798–99 (Mass. 1982); and child custody, see Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 379, 384
(Mass. 1979).
Henry v. Jefferson Cty. Planning Comm’n, 215 F.3d 1318, at *5 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Barclays
Bank Int’l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 1767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (“[I]n this
inherently imprecise context . . . .”).
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555–56 (2015).
Id. at 2563.
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581–82 (1974).
Doe v. Biang, 494 F. Supp. 2d 880, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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as no surprise that courts have reached questionable—and even
contradictory—results when reasoning in this fashion.328
3. Miscellaneous Justifications
As explained above, Hoffman Estates did not claim to be all-encompassing.
It simply formalized a series of doctrinal precepts that the Supreme Court’s
earlier decisions “ha[d] recognized.”329 At no point, moreover, has the Court
forbidden lower courts from developing new rationales for applying
differential vagueness scrutiny. One can hardly fault these actors for filling
doctrinal space that the Court has never closed off to experimentation.
Although courts have not fully capitalized on this freedom, a shift toward
greater methodological self-rule could strain the beleaguered Hoffman Estates
regime past the breaking point.
Three real-life doctrinal coinages help illustrate this concern. First, the
Seventh Circuit has announced that vagueness review “must be calibrated to
the kind and degree of the burdens imposed on those who must comply with
the regulatory scheme.”330 In other words, “[t]he greater the burden on the
regulated class, the more acute the need for clarity and precision.”331 The
“burdens” referenced here are not penalties for noncompliance, but the
practical obstacles that parties must overcome to conform to the law—
including the cost of hiring “lawyers to advise [them] about compliance.”332
If accepted, this principle would ironically increase the burden on reviewing
courts by requiring particularized fact-finding into the resources and legal
acumen of specific regulated entities. It would also entail the selection of a
contestable normative baseline—namely, which types of practical burdens
should be tolerated in a host of contexts. There can be little doubt that
burden-based variability would profoundly transform the character of
vagueness doctrine.
Second, the Fifth Circuit “permit[s] slightly more imprecision” when
laws are applied “by a relatively small number of enforcement officials to a
328

329
330
331
332

For example, one federal court posited that because “[p]rison life is highly routine,” it “ought not
to be difficult to establish in advance reasonably clear rules as to expected behavior.” Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 655 (E.D. Va. 1971). But another court has insisted that “[m]ore
specificity in the prison context would be impossible.” Booker v. Maly, No. 9:12-CV-246, 2014 WL
1289579, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 837 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.; see also Metal Mgmt. West, Inc. v. State, 251 P.3d 1164, 1172 (Colo. App. 2010) (deeming
“compliance with the statute . . . not [a] huge burden[]”).
Wis. Right to Life, 751 F.3d at 837.
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relatively small number of people.”333 In these situations, “certain patterns
of enforcement and tacit understandings” can develop—a type of dialectic
refinement wholly absent when laws are “enforced against the public at large
in multifarious contexts.”334 The premise of this approach is not that judicial
decisions will eventually narrow a law’s reach through one or more limiting
constructions. It is that local executive actors will come to exercise their
immense enforcement discretion in highly predictable ways, such that textual
opacity will cease to pose any meaningful constitutional problem. This
philosophy is hard to reconcile with the vagueness doctrine’s insistence that
written laws establish “minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement,”
rather than enabling executive officials to customize the content of enacted
law.335 The Fifth Circuit’s approach would also create intractable linedrawing problems, such as how small and homogeneous an enforcement
community must be for the requisite “patterns” and “tacit understandings”
to develop.
Finally, some courts have applied a highly deferential vagueness test
when there is no tradition of invalidating certain types of regulations on
vagueness grounds. In upholding a loosely worded enactment, the Fourth
Circuit noted that “[h]ospitals have historically had wide discretion to make
decisions regarding their medical staff.”336 And the Second Circuit has
applied a “less exacting . . . test of vagueness” in light of “the historical
acceptance of an extremely broad standard for legislatures’ decisions about
the fitness of their members.”337 Such an approach threatens to freeze
vagueness variability in its tracks, interposing a formidable threshold barrier
in cases of first impression. And a historically grounded presumption of
constitutionality is in tension with the Court’s decision in Smith v. Goguen,
which deplored the “unfettered latitude” afforded under a type of law whose
adoption had been “universal.”338
Whatever the flaws of these approaches, any hazards of methodological
freelancing must be laid at the Supreme Court’s doorstep. The Court’s
narrow and infrequent interventions in variability doctrine have—for better
or worse—granted lower courts a vast license to innovate.
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ISKCON v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 831 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 218 (4th Cir. 2002).
Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 599 F.3d 148, 158 (2d Cir. 2010).
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578, 582 n.31 (1974).
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4. Domain Battles
This laissez faire approach to vagueness variability is exacerbated by an
even more glaring doctrinal blind spot: the Court’s persistent failure to clarify
which types of enactments are susceptible to vagueness challenges. As
outlined above, it is unclear whether a law must directly regulate behavior—
or prescribe a corresponding penalty—in order to be challengeable on
vagueness grounds.339 This conceptual void has created a rift among lower
courts as to whether certain kinds of laws are subject to limited scrutiny, or
simply no scrutiny at all. This is true of license-eligibility provisions,340
internal decisionmaking guidelines,341 statutes governing parole342 and
pretrial detention,343 and laws creating government subsidies.344 The
confusion has even extended to statutes that unquestionably do regulate
behavior.345 Notwithstanding the reform agenda outlined below in Part IV,
it may be unrealistic to expect the Court to rationalize its tiered-vagueness
jurisprudence until it first answers the more fundamental question of what
vagueness doctrine is for.

339
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342

343

344
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See supra notes 203–208.
Compare Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 739 F.3d 936, 942 (6th Cir. 2014) (deeming vagueness
doctrine inapplicable, given the absence of any affected liberty or property interest), with Malfitano
v. County of Storey, 396 P.3d 815, 818 (Nev. 2017) (tolerating “a degree of vagueness in this context
not otherwise permissible,” given that “there is no criminal or civil penalty for failing to comply”).
Compare All Aire Conditioning, Inc. v. City of New York, 979 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“[P]laintiffs may not predicate a vagueness claim on the [internal prosecutorial] standards.”), with
Jackson v. W., 419 S.E.2d 385, 403 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that “the greatest level of tolerance
should be afforded” to a set of “interpretive guidelines lacking the force and effect of law”).
Compare Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 180 (1st Cir. 1987) (characterizing parole as a “gratuitous
benefit,” and deeming vagueness doctrine inapplicable for that reason), with Hess v. Bd. of Parole
& Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (specifying a reduced “level of
specificity . . . for a parole release statute to avoid impermissible vagueness”).
Compare United States ex rel. Fitzgerald, 747 F.2d 1120, 1129 (7th Cir. 1984) (deeming vagueness
doctrine inapplicable to a statute “not framed in terms of delineating sanctions for prohibited
conduct”), with United States v. Watkins, 18-CR-131, 2018 WL 4922135, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,
2018) (holding that the statute “provides due process,” given the “consequences of imprecision”).
On appeal, the Second Circuit in Watkins held that the challenged provision of the federal Bail
Reform Act was “not amenable to a [vagueness] challenge.” United States v. Watkins, 940 F.3d
152, 161 (2d Cir. 2019).
Compare Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 599 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (concluding that vagueness doctrine “has no application to funding”), with Great Am.
Houseboat Co. v. United States, 780 F.2d 741, 746–47 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]olerance is greatest in
cases where the consequences of noncompliance are mere reduction of government subsidy.”).
Compare Toppins v. Day, 73 F. App’x 84, at *2 (5th Cir. 2003) (denying “that prison regulations can
be found void for vagueness”), with Meyers v. Aldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 310 (3d Cir. 1974) (“Due
process undoubtedly requires certain minimal standards of specificity in prison regulations . . . .”).
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III. TAILORED “ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE”
A stylized approach toward vagueness review subdivides the analysis into
two sequential steps: (1) selecting an appropriate level of scrutiny and (2)
determining whether, under that standard, a law fails to provide fair notice
or prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The fair-notice
inquiry relies on a norm of objective reasonableness: whether a “person of
ordinary intelligence” could fairly know what is prohibited.346 This
formulation was meant to obviate case-by-case inquiries into the actual
capabilities and intelligence of individual litigants. But the doctrine also
recognizes that each law must provide “fair notice to those to whom [it] is
directed.”347
This precept undergirds a crucial variability principle missing from
Hoffman Estates: that the same statutory language may provide fair notice to
certain categories of persons, but not to others. Some regulations, for
example, apply only to a limited group of sophisticated actors who can be
justly regarded as a distinct interpretive community. When lawgivers speak
in an idiomatic tongue, due process will tolerate less precision than if the
same prohibitory language had been directed to the general public.
Conversely, when laws apply to persons who—as a class—unmistakably lack
“ordinary” adult intelligence, vagueness review should be at its most
exacting.
This Part exposes the permeability of the boundary between Hoffman
Estates variability and the constitutional demand of fair notice. In Part III.A,
I demonstrate that tailored “ordinary intelligence” has quietly functioned as
a bedrock premise of modern variability doctrine. In a multitude of settings,
courts have held professionals and other experts to a higher standard of
knowledge than could be required of society as a whole. And in Part III.B, I
identify a burgeoning norm of holding children to a reduced standard of
intelligence—exactly as the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on the
constitutional rights of juveniles would seem to dictate. These overwhelming
patterns should be explicitly accounted for in a revised variability framework.

346
347

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added) (alteration in original).

December 2021]

VARIABLE VAGUENESS

1015

A. Vagueness for Experts
In 1961, the Supreme Court disposed of a vagueness claim by finding
that “business people of ordinary intelligence,” applying “ordinary
commercial knowledge,” were sufficiently apprised of what the challenged
statute prohibited.348 The Hoffman Estates Court—in a separate section of its
opinion—similarly inquired into what “[a] business person of ordinary
intelligence” would understand.349 And in 2007, the Court measured fair
notice against the knowledge that “doctors of ordinary intelligence”
possessed.350 With these decisions, the Court expressly recognized that legal
language can bear an idiomatic meaning to professional and other technical
audiences. The U.S. Reports are replete with implementations of this idea,
even when the Court does not specifically gesture toward the protean nature
of “ordinary intelligence.”351
Lower courts have exercised this implied tailoring authority in a
multitude of additional settings. Rather than simply ask what “ordinary
people”352 would know, they have measured constitutional fair notice against
the capacities of ordinary lawyers,353 manufacturers,354 pilots,355

348
349
350
351

352
353
354
355

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 428 (1961).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501 (1982).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007).
See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644–45 (1985) (evaluating the phrase “‘conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar’ . . . in light of the traditional duties imposed on an attorney”); Hoffman Estates,
455 U.S. at 501 n.18 (“[T]hat technical term has sufficiently clear meaning in the drug
paraphernalia industry.”); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963)
(reviewing a vagueness challenge “[i]n view of the business practices against which [the challenged
law] was unmistakably directed”); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210,
242–43 (1932) (inquiring whether a prohibition was “sufficiently definite to enable those familiar
with the operation of oil wells” to comprehend it); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926) (observing that some laws “hav[e] a technical or other special meaning, well enough known
to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them”); Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267
U.S. 233, 240–41 (1925) (citing the absence of an “accepted . . . commercial standard which could
be regarded as impliedly taken up and adopted by the statute”); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman,
266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (“[T]he term ‘kosher’ has a meaning well enough defined to enable one
engaged in the trade to correctly apply it . . . .”); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918)
(“Men familiar with range conditions . . . will have little difficulty in determining what is prohibited
by it.”).
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (plurality opinion).
Hayes v. N.Y. Att’y Grievance Comm., 672 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 2012); Wilson v. State Bar of
Ga., 132 F.3d 1422, 1430 (11th Cir. 1998); Jump v. Goldenhersh, 619 F.2d 11, 15 (8th Cir. 1980).
Alliance for Nat. Health v. Sebelius, 775 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133 (D.D.C. 2011).
State v. Ring, 259 P. 780, 782 (Ore. 1927).
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developers,356 employers,357 distributors,358 exporters,359 teachers,360
dentists,361 mine operators,362 securities professionals,363 taxi drivers,364
military servicemembers,365 radio broadcasters,366 dairy operators,367 and
law-enforcement officers.368
The principle of customized ordinary
intelligence has been most aptly summarized as follows: When “a select
group of persons ha[s] specialized knowledge, and the challenged
phraseology is indigenous to the idiom of that class, the standard [of
specificity] is lowered.”369 Innumerable decisions endorse the technique of
class-based fair notice,370 and I am aware of no authorities that question its
propriety. But for whatever reason, the concept has not been conventionally
understood as bearing on the level-of-scrutiny inquiry, even though it calls
for relaxing the stringency of review.
Fair-notice tailoring should not be undertaken reflexively. For example,
it would be disingenuous to argue that “widow[s] of reasonable

356
357

358
359
360
361
362

363
364
365
366
367
368

369
370

CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 632 (3d Cir. 2013).
Jake’s Fireworks Inc. v. Acosta, 893 F.3d 1248, 1258 (10th Cir. 2018); Rimmer v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 656 F.2d 323, 330 (8th Cir. 1981); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327,
1336 (6th Cir. 1978); CompassCare v. Cuomo, 465 F. Supp. 3d 122, 166 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).
Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 738 (9th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 1999).
Williams v. Vidmar, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Barringer v. Caldwell Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 473 S.E.2d 435, 441 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
Kerr v. State Bd. of Dentistry, No. 1539 C.D.2007, 2008 WL 9398716, at *9 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2008).
United States v. Mostad, 760 F. App’x 512, 514 (9th Cir. 2019); Am. Coal Co. v. Fed. Coal Co. v.
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 796 F.3d 18, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Rock of Ages Corp.
v. Sec’y of Labor, 170 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1999); Walker Stone Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 156 F.3d
1076, 1084 (10th Cir. 1998).
Heath v. SEC, 586 F.3d 122, 141 (2d Cir. 2009).
Padberg v. McGrath-McKechnie, 203 F. Supp. 2d 261, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Yeoman v. West, 140 F.3d 1443, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Info. Providers’ Coal. for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir.
1991).
Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Fred Schakel Dairy, No. 1:05-CV-00707, 2008 WL 850136, at *16
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008).
United States v. Spicer, 656 F. App’x 154, 159 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. John-Baptiste, 747
F.3d 186, 200 (3d Cir. 2014); Lewis v. Smith, Civ. No. 18-4776, 2019 WL 3536343, at *10 (E.D.
La. Aug. 2, 2019).
Precious Metals Assocs. v. CFTC, 620 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1980).
See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Whether the regulation in
question here is understandable to the average person is not the issue.”); United States v. Swarovski,
592 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1979) (“We are dealing here with a regulation of limited scope aimed at
a small and relatively sophisticated group of persons.”); Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546,
556 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (noting that statutes sometimes “deal[] with a limited class of persons, so
situated as to have specialized knowledge concerning the acts prohibited”).
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intelligence”371 or “transient sex offender[s] of ordinary intelligence”372 could
not comprehend a challenged law, for those groups possess no distinctive
attributes that vagueness doctrine should strive to accommodate. But
genuine class-based fair notice is a pervasive feature of modern vagueness
variability, despite its absence from the Hoffman Estates canon. It would
behoove the Court to supplement its theoretical embrace of “ordinary
intelligence”373 with a frank acknowledgment that vagueness doctrine has
long accounted for a rich diversity of ordinary intelligences.
B. Vagueness for Children
Vagueness’s “ordinary intelligence” standard readily accommodates yet
another form of class-wide tailoring. In recent decades, the Supreme Court
has adopted a general presumption that doctrinal tests must account for
children’s distinctive traits, perspectives, and life experiences. This approach
maintains continuity with a key American legal tradition: that “children
cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.”374 Accordingly, the Court has
acted to ensure that doctrines “designed for adults [are] not uncritically
applied to children.”375 In the Court’s phrasing, “it is the odd legal rule that
does not have some form of exception for children.”376
The Court has even gone so far as to require an affirmative “justification
for taking a different course” in any given setting.377 Notably, this is true
“even where a ‘reasonable person’ standard otherwise applies.”378 The deck
is thus heavily stacked against the unqualified application of adult-centric
vagueness principles to children. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what could
justify treating children comparably to adults when adjudicating vagueness
challenges. Courts have not hesitated to highlight children’s relative
ignorance of the legal system and their difficulty in learning what the law

371
372
373
374

375
376
377
378

United States v. Seay, 718 F.2d 1279, 1290 (4th Cir. 1983) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
United States v. Bruffy, No. 1:10cr77, 2010 WL 2640165, at *3 (E.D. Va. 2010).
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011); see also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Children have a very special place in life which law should
reflect.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944) (explaining that “[w]hat may be wholly
permissible for adults . . . may not be so for children”).
Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 794 (2011).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481 (2012).
J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274.
Id.; see also id. (refusing to apply an undifferentiated “reasonable person” standard to selfincrimination doctrine, given “the reality that children are not adults”).
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forbids.379 And a key focus of vagueness doctrine is to ensure that “regulated
parties . . . know what is required of them.”380 It is no help to juveniles if
reasonably intelligent adults can steer clear of legal proscriptions. It would
simply be “nonsensical” to proceed in this way “as though [children] were
not children.”381
In keeping with these principles, lower courts routinely acknowledge—
both when sustaining382 and rejecting383 vagueness claims—that legal
enactments applicable to children must be fairly comprehensible to children.
Three federal circuit courts (the Fourth,384 Seventh,385 and Tenth386) have
379

380
381
382

383

384

385
386

See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015) (“[R]esearch on children’s understanding of the
legal system finds that young children have little understanding of prosecution.”); Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012) (referring to children’s “inability to deal with police officers
or prosecutors” and their “incapacity to assist [their] own attorneys”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 78 (2010) (“Juveniles . . . have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles
of the institutional actors within it.”); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (“[A child]
cannot be compared with an adult . . . knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.”);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion) (describing children as “easy victim[s]
of the law”); State v. Joanna V., 94 P.3d 783, 787 (N.M. 2004) (explaining that “children . . . cannot
[be] expect[ed] to appreciate the subtle shades and nuances of our law”).
FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (emphases added).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 474.
See, e.g., Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[M]inors subject to the
ordinance are not given fair notice . . . .”); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975)
(stating that regulations must “convey notice to students . . . of what is prohibited”) (internal
citations omitted); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 789
(N.D. Ind. 2011) (“[V]agueness will void a policy that fails to give a student adequate warning that
his conduct is unlawful . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted); James P. v. Lemahieu, 84 F. Supp. 2d
1113, 1121 (D. Hi. 2000) (holding that a statute “d[id] not provide ‘fair notice’ to students”); Ashton
v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 458 (Md. 1995) (“[W]e do not understand how a seventeen year old . . .
could tell whether he or she was [violating a juvenile curfew ordinance].”).
See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Hopkinton Public Schs., Civ. No. 19-11384-WGY, 2020 WL 5638019,
at *16 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2020) (“[A] school-age child of common intelligence understands that
. . . .”); Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 267 (3d Cir. 2002) (deeming
a school policy “specific enough to give fair notice to the students”); Turner v. Sw. City Sch. Dist.,
82 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (“Students . . . are on notice of what conduct is
prohibited.”); Dempsey v. Alston, 966 A.2d 1, 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (finding a law to
be “not so vague as to leave . . . students without knowledge of its requirements”); In re Jackson, 497
P.2d 259, 261 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the challenged statutory language “gives
fundamentally fair notice to the child”).
See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1980) (tailoring the notice requirement to
“a reasonably intelligent high school student”); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th
Cir. 1973) (same, for “a reasonably intelligent student”).
See Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 520 (7th Cir. 2010) (inquiring into what “[a]
student of ordinary intelligence” would understand).
See Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 51 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying a “reasonable
high school student of ordinary intelligence” standard); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260,
206 F.3d 1358, 1368 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying a “reasonable student of ordinary intelligence”
standard).
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gone a step further, expressly tailoring the fair-notice requirement to the
capabilities of a “reasonable” or “ordinary” student. Many other federal and
state decisions have employed such language,387 and jurists have similarly
measured fair notice against what “children of ordinary understanding,”388
“child[ren] . . . of common intelligence,”389 “juveniles of common
intelligence,”390 and “reasonable juvenile[s]”391 would know. As one state
court has observed, when a rule applies to schoolchildren, “the test to be
applied is that it must be capable of comprehension by a student who is
possessed of average intelligence.”392 This bounty of decisional law reflects a
simple truth: Vagueness doctrine’s “‘ordinary people’ standard takes on an
air of unreality” when applied to non-adults.393
To be sure, this principle is not universally accepted. The Supreme
Court has never squarely articulated a juvenile-specific fair-notice standard.
Its decades-old Fraser decision, which tolerates a great deal of imprecision in
school disciplinary rules, contains no hint of such a norm.394 And at least one
court has refused to apply a stricter vagueness test to an ordinance subjecting
juveniles to criminal penalties, reasoning that “children do not possess the
same rights as adults.”395 But it is striking that so many courts have
387

388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395

Courts have used the following formulations: “a [student] of ordinary intelligence,” Young
America’s Found. v. Kaler, 370 F. Supp. 3d 967, 993 (D. Minn. 2019) (alteration in original)
(quotation marks omitted); “ordinary middle school students,” S.N.B. v. Pearland Indep. Sch. Dist.,
120 F. Supp. 3d 620, 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014); “a reasonable student of ordinary intelligence,”
Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 674 F. Supp. 2d 725, 744–45 (D.S.C. 2009); “a reasonable
student,” Nguon v. Wolf, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2007); “a reasonable student of
ordinary intelligence,” A.M. v. Cash, No. 3:07-CV-272-N, 2007 WL 9723149, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
July 10, 2007); “a reasonable student,” Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F.
Supp. 2d 1096, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2004); “a reasonably intelligent thirteen year-old,” Wagner ex rel.
Wagner-Garay v. Ft. Wayne Cmty. Schs., 255 F. Supp. 2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ind. 2003); “the
reasonable Westfield High School student,” Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield,
249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 127 (D. Mass. 2003); “an average student,” Wiemerslage ex rel. Wiemerslage v.
Me. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207, 824 F. Supp. 136, 141 (N.D. Ill. 1993); “ordinary students,”
Claiborne v. Beebe Sch. Dist., 687 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (E.D. Ark. 1988); “reasonable students,”
Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 523 (C.D. Cal. 1969); “a student with
common intelligence,” Parkins v. Boule, No. 94000987, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 331, at *21 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 1994); “a student of ordinary intelligence,” Hwang ex rel. Hwang v. Amity Reg’l Bd. of Educ.,
No. CV 94-0362420, 1994 WL 468279, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
See Dist. of Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58, 60 (D.C. 1975); Blondheim v. State, 529 P.2d 1096,
1100 (Wash. 1975) (en banc).
S.H.B. v. State, 355 So.2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., dissenting).
In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385, 1390 (Haw. 1973) (Richardson, C.J., dissenting).
City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 343 (Wis. 1988) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
Dumez v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 334 So.2d 494, 502 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
United States v. J.D.T., 762 F.3d 984, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring).
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
Schleifer ex rel. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998).
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independently gravitated toward a standard—fair notice to children—that the
Supreme Court has never directly mandated. And Fraser’s hands-off
approach toward disciplinary due process is in serious tension with the fact
that children are not “person[s] of ordinary intelligence.”396 It would be
highly anomalous to inflict severe disciplinary sanctions based on school
policies that juveniles could not hope to understand.
At a minimum, Supreme Court precedent poses no obstacle to applying
a “reasonable child” standard outside the narrow context of “school
disciplinary rules.”397 This is true even of criminal and civil enactments that
regulate behavior in the school context. To take just one example, children
should not be precluded from challenging broadly worded “school
disturbance” prohibitions even though the Court has—in a challenge
brought by adult litigants—upheld an ordinance criminalizing the act of
“disturb[ing]” a school session.398 The Court would do well to enshrine the
emerging proposition that vagueness doctrine cannot hold children to an
adult standard of responsibility. And more broadly, advocates should
leverage the technique of tiered review to rethink which types of prohibitions
are susceptible to credible vagueness challenges. It will be the rarest of
precedents that entirely insulates a linguistic formulation from vagueness
attack by all persons in all settings, regardless of the practical implications of
liability.
IV. REFORMING VARIABLE VAGUENESS
As experience has shown, the Hoffman Estates framework suffers from deep
theoretical and practical impurities. It relies on an assortment of misguided
proxies; its basic terms have proven perplexing to administer; it has
engendered perverse consequences; it does not even account for several
common variability considerations; and, as I will show in Part IV.A, it leaves
lower courts rudderless when the framework’s factors point in different
directions. Even if variability principles are “incapable of precise,
mechanistic application,”399 that is no reason to condone a regime of illusory
constraints that make a mockery of vagueness’s core objectives.

396
397
398

399

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110–14 (1972). For a gripping examination of states’
criminal “school disturbance” laws, see Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, THE
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2016/11/how-america-outlawed-adolescence/501149/ [https://perma.cc/LTN9-6XTB].
Cruz v. Town of Cicero, No. 99-C-3286, 1999 WL 560989, at *15 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1999).
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This Part proposes a better way. I argue for a drastically simplified
variability test centered around just two factors: penalty-sensitivity and
specialized fair notice. Instead of advancing these values through faulty
surrogate rules, however, courts should pursue those aims openly and
directly—exactly as many decisions already have. The approach advanced
below would not eliminate the residuum of discretion that underlies this
intrinsically circumstantial enterprise. But my two-step proposal would
greatly reduce the inquiry’s freewheeling character and facilitate a
transparent exercise of judgment in service of what really matters.400
A. The Perils of Mixing and Matching
The Supreme Court’s Hoffman Estates framework rests on four discrete
dichotomies: whether a law is economic in nature, carries civil or criminal
penalties, contains a scienter requirement, or threatens to impair
constitutional rights.401 But of course, any given law may exhibit a grab bag
of these qualities—as well as a variety of extracanonical factors. The Court’s
inattention to how these components might interact must be counted among
Hoffman Estates’s chief failings. That shortcoming has, predictably, led to
sharp divergences among lower courts about how to reconcile clashing
variability criteria. Put simply, the problem of mixing and matching poses a
serious threat to the coherence and administrability of tiered vagueness
review. Minimizing this conceptual dissonance—and forthrightly addressing
how the constituent principles of vagueness variability interact—should be
an overarching aim of doctrinal reform.
This problem is most pronounced when layering criminal penalties on
top of economic regulations. In fact, there is a clear circuit split on how
stringently courts must review such laws. Some courts have rounded up—
applying an exacting standard to all criminal statutes402—while most have
rounded down, emphasizing the more permissive context of business

400

401
402

See SHAMAN, supra note 6, at 105 (arguing that rigid tiers of scrutiny “hamper[] legal analysis by
deflecting the focus of inquiry toward abstractions that are divorced from the specific merits of a
case”).
See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982).
See Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1984); Elizondo v. Harris County, Civ. No.
H-14-393, 2014 WL 12769280, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2014); United States v. Agriprocessors,
Inc., No. 08-CR-1324-LRR, 2009 WL 2255728, at *14 (N.D. Iowa July 27, 2009); United States
v. Sun & Sand Imports, Ltd., 564 F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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behavior.403 The Court has cultivated further uncertainty by announcing
that “quasi-criminal” civil sanctions,404 as well as ones that “could have an
adverse impact on [a party’s] reputation,”405 warrant heightened vagueness
scrutiny. These ill-defined concepts give courts wide-ranging discretion to
override a conventional application of Hoffman Estates in virtually every civil
or “business” case.
Consider another conundrum: Which standard applies when a criminal
statute contains a scienter requirement (as virtually all do406)? According to
Hoffman Estates, criminal statutes warrant stringent vagueness review.407 Yet
the presence of a scienter requirement is said to “mitigate a law’s
vagueness.”408 Courts have splintered on this question, as well, applying both
relaxed409 and fully heightened410 review to criminal laws containing a
scienter requirement. Hoffman Estates did itself no credit by positing
variability factors that would cancel each other out in a vast number of cases.
This sort of tunnel vision has also caused lower courts to uphold criminal
statutes on the ground that they could not have been drafted more
precisely.411
Hoffman Estates failed to clarify the proper interaction between yet another
pair of clashing categories: economic regulations and laws threatening to
inhibit constitutional rights. Some decisions have applied exacting scrutiny

403

404
405
406
407
408
409

410

411

See United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d
630, 635 (9th Cir. 1989); Horvath v. City of Chicago, 510 F.2d 594, 596 n.8 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 602 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. $122,043.00, 792 F.2d 1470,
1477 (9th Cir. 1986); Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 274 F.R.D. 525, 544 (D. Md. 2011); Parrish
v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356, 1367 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); State ex rel. Guste v. K-Mart Corp., 462
So.2d 616, 621 (La. 1985).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499.
FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 256 (2012).
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“[T]he ‘general rule’ is that a guilty mind
is ‘a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime.’”).
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498–99.
Id. at 499.
See United States v. Sun & Sand Imports, Ltd., 725 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1984); Mike Naughton
Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 862 F. Supp. 264, 271 (D. Colo. 1994); Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d
1356, 1367 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
See Condon v. Wolfe, 310 F. App’x 807, 821 (6th Cir. 2009); Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009,
1011 (9th Cir. 2000); Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1984); Planned
Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1020 (D. Idaho 2005); State v.
Alangcas, 345 P.3d 181, 197 (Haw. 2015).
See Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002); United States v.
Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 438 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 198 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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to laws restricting commercial speech412 and ones impairing constitutional
property rights,413 notwithstanding the presence of a paradigmatic lowscrutiny consideration.
Others, however, have declined to afford
commercial-speech regulations the full benefit of “constitutional” vagueness
review.414
Hoffman Estates is also silent on whether civil laws implicating
constitutional rights should be reviewed as stringently as their criminal
counterparts. One court has held that all such laws must receive the same
demanding scrutiny, “[r]egardless of whether a statute is civil or criminal in
nature.”415 Other decisions, however, have applied only “mixed”416 or
“loosen[ed]”417 scrutiny to civil enactments implicating constitutional rights.
Relatedly, several courts—presupposing the possibility of hybrid inputs—
have applied merely an intermediate level of scrutiny (such as a “moderately
stringent” test418) to criminal laws not perceived to threaten constitutional
rights. These decisions are difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s
insistence that “the most exacting vagueness standard” applies to criminal
statutes, whatever their effect on constitutional rights.419
Finally, it is unclear why certain low-scrutiny contexts—such as military
regulations, school policies, and public-employment rules—deserve to
override other features that typically trigger demanding vagueness review.
For example, the challenger in Parker v. Levy (an Army dermatologist) was
“sentenced to dismissal from [military] service, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and confinement for three years at hard labor” for speaking out
412

413

414
415
416
417
418

419

See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423, 433 (1963) (requiring “narrow specificity” of a law
regulating the “solicitation of legal business”); Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless
Personal Commc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 805 (M.D. La. 2004) (“[B]ecause the TCPA regulates
constitutionally protected commercial speech, it must satisfy a more rigid vagueness test . . . .”).
See Yoder v. City of Bowling Green, No. 3:17 CV 2321, 2019 WL 415254, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 1, 2019) (clarifying that a more exacting standard applies when “property rights” are at stake);
City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1143 (Ohio 2006) (holding that eminent-domain
laws warrant “the heightened standard of review employed for a statute . . . implicat[ing] a First
Amendment or other fundamental constitutional right”).
See supra note 233.
CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 900 (S.D. Ind. 2015).
Gay Men’s Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
O’Toole v. O’Connor, No. 2:15-cv-1446, 2016 WL 4394135, at *16 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
Copeland v. Vance, 893 F.3d 101, 114 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Betancourt v. Bloomberg, 448 F.3d
547, 553 (2d Cir. 2006)); Condon v. Wolfe, 310 F. App’x 807, 821 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bloomberg,
448 F.3d at 553); see also United States v. Posters ‘N’ Things Ltd., 969 F.2d 652, 659 (8th Cir. 1992)
(applying “neither the most stringent nor the most tolerant of tests”).
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018) (plurality opinion). Still, under the Hoffman Estates
framework, it stands to reason that constitutionally fraught criminal statutes ought to be reviewed
doubly stringently.
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against the Vietnam War.420
Notwithstanding these devastating
consequences and the flagrant suppression of political expression, the Court
permitted Congress to legislate “with greater breadth and with greater
flexibility” in the military setting—full stop.421 Levy exemplifies the Court’s
penchant for virtually immunizing certain institutional settings from
vagueness challenges, regardless of the resulting hardships.
Heeding this lesson, lower courts have held that public entities enjoy
“broad discretion”422 to fire civil servants for “conduct unbecoming” of their
positions,423 as well as “broad authority” to expel unruly students.424 It is
apparently irrelevant that these actions can be deeply stigmatizing,
threatening serious harm to the personal and professional reputations of
supposed transgressors. We should not be surprised when courts likewise
level down—without explanation—in new contexts implicating both highand low-scrutiny considerations.425
The tensions explored in this Section are exacerbated by persistent
disagreement over how to apply each Hoffman Estates factor, as well as the
unrelenting expansion of specialized scrutiny contexts. If vagueness
variability is to accomplish its underlying goals—and exert any real
constraining force—its operative principles must be drastically simplified and
realigned with the basic purposes of tiered review.
B. A Path Forward
1. Bidding Farewell to Hoffman Estates
The Hoffman Estates formulation has persisted for nearly forty years
without material modification or refinement. It is no minor accomplishment
for a doctrinal framework to have achieved such staying power—and to have
evaded any serious effort at revision. But as I hope to have demonstrated,
Hoffman Estates’s shortcomings are far too profound to permit continued
420
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Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 736, 738–39 (1974); see also Stan Thomas Todd, Note, Vagueness
Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A Focus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855,
870 (1974) (noting that “[i]n the military . . . context[] especially, the potential severity of the
sanctions is tremendous”).
Levy, 417 U.S. at 756.
Hernandez v. Bailey, 716 F. App’x 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2018).
See, e.g., Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1569 (10th Cir. 1989) (police officer); Wishart v.
McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1116 (1st Cir. 1974) (schoolteacher).
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 260 (3d Cir. 2002).
See United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) (commenting that district courts
enjoy “broad” latitude to set conditions of supervised release, “even when [they] affect fundamental
rights”).
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inertia. A reformulated variability test is urgently needed—one that should
begin by wiping clean the existing quartet of canonical variability factors.
First, the Court should cease categorizing challenged enactments as
“economic” or “noneconomic” in nature. The meaning of that term is
subject to deep theoretical contestation, and a law’s classification as
“economic” (or not) is a poor proxy for the rule’s stated justifications.426
Those underlying purposes, moreover, bear little connection to the question
Hoffman Estates claimed to be answering: how much imprecision the
Constitution tolerates in various legal settings. Vagueness doctrine already
contains superior tools for holding sophisticated actors to a stricter fair-notice
standard. Hoffman Estates’s first variability factor should thus be discarded as
a failed experiment.
Second, any lingering suggestion of a strict civil/criminal divide should
suffer the same fate. To be sure, that distinction enjoys deep constitutional
roots and reflects a sensible rule of thumb in most vagueness cases.427 But it
is patently untrue that “the consequences of imprecision” entailed by civil
penalties are, across the board, “qualitatively less severe” than their criminal
counterparts.428 And the current phrasing fails to account for another
obvious truth: that extraordinarily severe civil and criminal laws should not
be scrutinized comparably to garden-variety prohibitions. Yet lower courts
regularly employ a rigidly binary classification scheme, citing the apparent
constraints of Hoffman Estates. The Court’s recognition of a sphere of “quasicriminal” enactments evinces its justified discomfort with relying on crude
proxies for consequentialism, even if it has not fully embraced direct and
unmediated consequentialism.
Third, the presence or absence of a scienter requirement has no bearing
on “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates”429 in adjacent
prohibitory language. This Hoffman Estates factor—which the Court has
never attempted to justify in variability terms—has always been a conceptual
misfit. A refined variability framework should jettison the present focus on

426
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Justice Marshall once leveled a similar critique in the equal-protection context: “[I]n focusing
obsessively on the appropriate label to give its standard of review, the Court fails to identify the
interests at stake . . . .” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 478 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979) (explaining that, in the criminal context,
“the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude” that “our society imposes almost the entire
risk of error upon itself”); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (asserting that “the
power of the State weighs most heavily” in criminal cases).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
Id. at 498.
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scienter, thereby teeing up a more salient question: whether (and if so, when)
a mens rea element can aid in satisfying whatever standard of clarity applies
in a given context.
Finally, vagueness doctrine should cease inquiring into whether a
challenged law “threatens to inhibit”—or would otherwise affect—the
exercise of constitutional rights.430 This recommendation will surely be
controversial. Hoffman Estates characterized this variability factor as “perhaps
the most important,”431 and Professor Amsterdam’s seminal student note had
identified vagueness doctrine’s raison d’être as creating “an insulating buffer
zone of added protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights
freedoms.”432 Modern scholarship has similarly underscored the capacity of
vagueness doctrine to realize the First Amendment value of expressive
equality.433
But it has never been adequately explained why vagueness review must
entail a formal determination about the reach of one or more constitutional
rights. The Court has observed that “[w]hen speech is involved, rigorous
adherence to [vagueness] requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity
does not chill protected speech.”434 But First Amendment law already
contains a mechanism for ensuring that regulations will not “deter or ‘chill’
constitutionally protected speech”: the concept of overbreadth.435 It is
unclear why vagueness review should function as an inordinately strict
shadow First Amendment doctrine, leading to the invalidation of laws that
would survive ordinary analysis. Nor has the Court explained why vagueness
doctrine—uniquely—should be used to combat chilling effects on all
constitutional rights, thereby grafting overbreadth principles onto doctrines
that have never benefited from such prophylactic safeguards.436 In any event,
nearly all constitutional-rights doctrines involve some sort of tailoring
analysis that asks whether governments have regulated disproportionately
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Id. at 499.
Id.
Amsterdam, supra note 157, at 75.
See Sun, supra note 264, at 157–70 (examining the Court’s use of vagueness doctrine to advance
racial justice during the Civil Rights Movement).
FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253–54 (2012).
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct.
1575, 1585 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (contending that “vagueness doctrine’s application in
the First Amendment context” is functionally indistinguishable from overbreadth doctrine).
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“[W]e have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
768 (1982) (noting that overbreadth doctrine “is predicated on the sensitive nature of protected
expression”).
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broadly in relation to their avowed goals.437 The breadth and unintelligibility
of rights-affecting enactments can be fully accounted for at this stage.438 Put
differently, courts could just as easily underscore the strength of rights claims
by invoking credible vagueness concerns, rather than the other way around.
Even if it is still true that vagueness doctrine is “chiefly an instrument of
buffer-zone protection,”439 that would not justify elevating constitutional
concerns to the surface of vagueness doctrine. Vagueness review has also
been prominently deployed to “curb . . . law’s use for racialized social
control.”440 Yet the Supreme Court has never prescribed heightened
vagueness review for enactments that raise a suspicion of racial animus. In
fact, one of the doctrine’s core virtues is that it “does not compel judges to
ascribe ill will or bad faith” to governmental actors;441 the doctrine’s structure
simply creates the conditions for the fulfillment of other constitutional
values.442 That salutary feature will persist whether or not judges must make
second-order constitutional determinations in order to resolve vagueness
claims.
Until now, moreover, the immense costs of “constitutional” vagueness
review have gone overlooked. Predicating heightened scrutiny on the
presence of constitutional implications encourages cursory pronouncements
that threaten to distort the broader fabric of constitutional decisionmaking.
For courts inclined to make constitutional law only after careful reflection,
moreover, this type of bundled adjudication expends precious resources in
service of the ancillary task of scrutiny-setting. This feature of vagueness
variability also frustrates litigant autonomy by depriving plaintiffs of the
ability to secure a stand-alone vagueness ruling unencumbered by explicit or
implicit rights holdings. And if a liberty or property interest must be
implicated for vagueness doctrine to apply in the first place, formally
accounting for effects on constitutional values blurs the distinction between
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Dan T. Coenen, Quiet-Revolution Rulings in Constitutional Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2061, 2084–85 (2019).
See Collings, supra note 153, at 220 (“The result can be more simply reached by stating that the
statute . . . violates the principles of the First Amendment . . . .”); Note, Void for Vagueness: An Escape
from Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272, 284 (1948) (“Its invalidity could be urged from the
standpoint of vagueness. However, could it not be as strongly argued that the statute was invalid
because it conflicted with the First Amendment by restricting legitimate activity?”).
Amsterdam, supra note 157, at 85.
Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 243
(2017).
Sun, supra note 264, at 185 (emphasis added).
See Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of the Vagueness Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV.
2051, 2060 (2015) (contending that “[v]agueness cases are often controlled by factors extraneous to
vagueness doctrine”).
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enactments warranting stringent vagueness review and those warranting any
vagueness review.
2. A Successor Framework—and Its Benefits
Before articulating my proposed test, a preliminary clarification is in
order. My framework would regard the level-of-scrutiny inquiry as a
mandatory phase in the order of operations. Much modern vagueness
adjudication simply elides this step altogether, as if a controlling framework
had never been announced.443 Such haphazard decisionmaking should be
decisively curbed. To be sure, respecting the authoritative character of
variability doctrine would not require the selection of a level of scrutiny in
every case; courts could bypass that threshold question if the rigor of review
would make no practical difference. But my model would require that such
an assumption be made explicit, as is routinely done in other contexts.444
In place of the timeworn Hoffman Estates test, I propose a simplified twostep framework for selecting a level of vagueness scrutiny. Under this
approach, the underlying purposes of variability would no longer clash with
their implementing rules; they would become the rules.
At step one, courts should identify the penalty authorized by a challenged
law (or the penalty actually imposed)—as well as any other collateral
consequences445—and select a level of scrutiny corresponding directly with
the severity of these inputs. In this way, courts would examine the true
“consequences of imprecision”446 rather than imperfect substitutes for that
criterion. This approach would liberate judges to intensify their scrutiny of
laws that are nominally civil in character, but that are experienced as harshly
as criminal deprivations. Devising a sanction-centric variability framework
would also forestall a misconception prevalent among lower courts: that
criminal laws cannot receive exacting scrutiny unless constitutional concerns
are also present.447 And a penalty-based approach would encourage courts
to focus on which types of burdens trigger vagueness review in the first
443
444
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See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2239 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining
that, in an earlier case, the Court “did not need to, and so did not, decide the level-of-scrutiny
question because the law’s breadth made it unconstitutional under any standard”); Dist. of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (holding that the challenged law would fail under
“any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied”).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (recognizing that “the Texas criminal conviction
carries with it the other collateral consequences always following a conviction”).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
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place—a question that the Supreme Court has still never answered
satisfactorily.
To be sure, the type of unalloyed consequentialism I am proposing would
require courts to develop a new vocabulary of vagueness variability. Rather
than employing the ill-defined language of relativity—reviewing laws “less
strict[ly]”448 or “more stringent[ly]”449 than some unspecified median
enactment—courts would begin characterizing the level of vagueness
scrutiny in absolute terms. At least some growing pains are to be expected
under this regime. But in assessing the severity of a deprivation, courts could
draw upon the familiar framework of procedural due process, under which
the amount of process required depends on the “nature of the private interest
. . . affected.”450 And any remaining transition costs would be a small price
to pay for a concomitant increase in theoretical coherence.
Once a level of scrutiny has been selected at step one, at step two, courts
should determine whether to make an upward or downward adjustment
based on the nature of the regulated class. If a prohibition governs the
conduct of juveniles—or has been applied to a juvenile—then an especially
demanding form of scrutiny should apply. But if the challenged law employs
idiomatic language intelligible to a distinct subgroup, then courts should
tolerate more linguistic imprecision than would be permitted for laws
regulating society as a whole.451 In this way, the intuition behind Hoffman
Estates’s “economic” category—that sophisticated actors should be treated
less forgivingly than non-experts—would be advanced directly, rather than
through misguided stand-in principles. And to avoid unguided judicial forays
into technical domains, if the government wishes to receive the benefit of this
form of review, it should bear the burden of demonstrating that a specialized
body of relevant knowledge exists within the regulated community.
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Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
Id. at 499.
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444 (2011) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) (“In
government-initiated proceedings to determine juvenile delinquency, civil commitment,
deportation, and denaturalization, this Court has identified losses of individual liberty sufficiently
serious to warrant imposition of an elevated burden of proof.”) (citations omitted); Leading Case,
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine—Sessions v. Dimaya, 132 HARV. L. REV. 367, 374 (2018) (“Court[s]
should lean on this precedent when weighing various civil injuries for purposes of vagueness
analysis.”).
See Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 299 (“If a statute targeting a particular field uses terminology known
within that field, granting that terminology its specialized meaning is consistent with ensuring that
defendants receive fair notice of the law.”).
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These two considerations—the actual severity of penalties, followed by
any tailored-fair-notice adjustments—should be the sole components of a
modified variability framework. The Court should explicitly foreclose
reliance on all other considerations at this threshold stage. Two of those
factors in particular—the importance of a governmental interest and the
impossibility of drafting more precisely—tend to operate as trumps,
engulfing any consideration of statutory penalties. But if (for example) a
vaguely worded criminal statute cannot be written any more clearly, then
governmental goals must simply be pursued through other means.
Legislatures ought not be able to evade their constitutional due-process
obligations by regulating on especially important matters or characterizing
certain subjects as “inherently discretionary.”452 Nixing these criteria would
greatly streamline tiered vagueness review by minimizing the frequency with
which variability factors offset one another. Yet my proposal would still
account for the distinctiveness of institutional structures like the military and
the civil service, in which familiar “customs and usages” can impart
recognizable meaning to otherwise-obscure enactments.453
Finally, the stare decisis costs of transitioning to my two-step framework
would be surprisingly minimal. The “consequences of imprecision”454 have
always been a chief concern of vagueness variability—so much so that the
Court has twice reasoned directly from the severity of sanctions, including
most recently in 2018.455 And the Court has already measured fair notice
against the capacities of “business person[s] of ordinary intelligence”456 and
“doctors ‘of ordinary intelligence.’”457 Lower courts have exercised this tacit
tailoring authority countless times over the decades,458 thereby fulfilling the
ultimate objective of Hoffman Estates’s “economic regulation” test. The Court
would remain free to account for a scienter requirement’s effect on statutory
clarity once a level of scrutiny had been properly chosen. And although
discontinuing “constitutional” vagueness review would be a significant
change, the simplification gains would vastly outweigh any pangs of doctrinal
disruption. In fact, the disruption surely runs in both directions, insofar as
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Henry v. Jefferson Cty. Planning Comm’n, 215 F.3d 1318, at *5 (4th Cir. 2000).
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 746–47 (1974).
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text.
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 501; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 428 (1961) (using
the phrase “business people of ordinary intelligence”).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972)).
See supra notes 353–370.
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vagueness review has been a wellspring of drive-by determinations with
uncertain effects on substantive constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
After nearly four decades of disarray, there may be no corner of
constitutional doctrine whose essential mechanisms of tiered review are so
wholly up for grabs. Perhaps that is because vagueness variability—for all its
rhetoric of “more stringent”459 and “less strict”460 review—hardly exemplifies
the much-studied mechanics of tiered scrutiny. Vagueness variability is sui
generis, channeling courts’ appraisals of how much clarity the Constitution
demands in particular regulatory contexts. Because the peculiar workings of
tiered vagueness have never been methodically analyzed, scholars have
neglected to interrogate Hoffman Estates’s feeble foundations.
This Article has articulated a corrective vision for vagueness variability:
a near-exclusive focus on the severity of applicable penalties. By privileging
the “consequences of imprecision”461—the consequences themselves, rather
than crude proxies for those deprivations—the Court can squarely align the
aspirations of multi-tiered vagueness with the doctrinal tools chosen to
implement that concept. To be sure, pursuing variability’s core values
directly will sacrifice any benefits associated with strict rule-adherence. But
Hoffman Estates’s mechanized approach hardly merits a legacy of stability and
constraint. The Court should promptly expel this methodological decay—
and carefully monitor other fundamental frameworks for symptoms of
unworkability.
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